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THE INTENTION OF THE SETTLOR UNDER THE UNIFORM 
TRUST CODE: WHOSE PROPERTY IS IT, ANYWAY? 
Alan Newman* 
“Our goods, if we are so fortunate to have any, are not interred with 
our bones, but are left behind for others to enjoy. But we like to 
determine who shall enjoy them and how they shall be enjoyed. Shall 
we not do as we wish with our own?”1 
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 1. Austin W. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead. I., 65 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 527 (1917) 
(footnote omitted) [hereinafter Scott, Control of Property I]. For a discussion of the view that it is 
human nature to want to control wealth for future generations in a family, see Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1218 n.78 (1985). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The question of the extent to which the owner of property may 
transfer it gratuitously, but continue to exert control over its enjoyment 
by the donee, has a long history.2 During much of that history, the law 
protected donees from efforts by donors to impose restraints on 
transferred property.3 The traditional hostility to the enforcement of 
donor-imposed restraints protected the living from control by the dead,4 
as well as the alienability of property. At odds with those objectives is 
the policy of allowing the owner of property to dispose of it as he or she 
 
 2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS (Introductory Note, 
Historical Background) (1983); Alexander, supra note 1, at 1195-1201. 
 3. See Richard R. Powell, Freedom of Alienation – For Whom? The Clash of Theories, 2 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 127 (1967). 
 4. Professor Scott’s articulation of this view is typical: 
[T]his world with its good, or at least its material, things is a world for the living and not 
for the dead. It would not be the part of wisdom to allow the living, in their enjoyment of 
property, to be unduly trammeled by the wishes of the dead. . . . The welfare of society 
demands that the law should set limits to the power of the hand of the dead to control 
human affairs. 
Scott, Control of Property I, supra note 1, at 527. See also LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND 
THE DEAD HAND 140 (1955). 
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chooses.5 How to resolve the tension between these competing interests 
has received considerable attention.6 
Three traditional and fundamental questions these competing 
policies have raised are (i) the Rule Against Perpetuities issue of 
whether a trust settlor can create contingent interests that will last into 
the distant future, (ii) the Claflin7 doctrine issue of whether all of the 
beneficiaries of a trust can terminate it before the date specified for its 
termination by the settlor, and (iii) the spendthrift trust issue of whether 
the settlor can prevent the beneficiary from alienating – voluntarily or 
involuntarily – his or her interest in the trust. From the latter part of the 
nineteenth century to the present, these issues have been important ones 
with respect to the control over transferred property a trust settlor will be 
allowed to exert.8 The question of the extent to which a settlor’s intent 
 
 5. See Powell, supra note 3, at 127. The Ohio Supreme Court articulated this policy in a 
relatively recent case upholding the validity of spendthrift trusts: “[A]s a matter of policy, it is 
desirable for property owners to have, within reasonable bounds, the freedom to do as they choose 
with their own property. . . . In a society that values freedom as greatly as ours, this consideration is 
far from trivial.” Scott v. Bank One Trust Co., 577 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 (Ohio 1991). 
 6. The Foreword to the first two volumes of the new Restatement (Third) of Trusts notes that 
its principles 
have two main themes. One is to make it easier to accomplish the settlor’s intentions, so 
long as those intentions can be reliably established and do not offend public policy. The 
second is to recognize appropriate authority, through doctrines that include cy pres, to 
enable the living – especially judges – to adapt the settlor’s expressed purposes to 
contemporary circumstances. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, Foreword (2003). See also Alexander, supra note 1, at 1189 (“If 
the donor of a property interest tries to restrict the donee’s freedom to dispose of that interest, the 
legal system, in deciding whether to enforce or void that restriction, must resolve whose freedom it 
will protect, that of the donor or that of the donee.”); Powell, supra note 3, at 127 (“[I]t is the 
purpose of this article to explore how our present law has reached an uneasy compromise of these 
conflicting claims.. . .”); SIMES, supra note 4, at 140 (“our property institutions must be shaped in 
part by the dead hand. But working compromises must be found, whereby the dead are forever 
barred from withholding the scepter from the hand of the living”). For an economics-oriented 
perspective on this tension, see Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private 
Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295 (1988).  As noted by Professor Macey, 
[t]he legal right to dictate through a trust how wealth is to be used after death may lead 
to economic inefficiency because conditions inevitably will change in ways 
unforeseeable to the settlor. On the other hand, regulating how a settlor can dispose of 
his wealth may lead to inefficiencies because such interference would decrease the 
incentive to accumulate wealth, since influencing events and individuals after one’s 
death may provide a primary motivation for accumulating wealth during one’s life. 
Id. at 297. See also Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
621, 624-25 (2004) (arguing that the law should minimize the agency costs that are inherent in the 
trust relationship under which a trustee manages trust property for beneficiaries, but subject to the 
policy of giving effect to the intent of the settlor). 
 7. Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). 
 8. In the United States, trust law has long respected the intention of the settlor to prohibit 
beneficiaries from alienating their interests, voluntarily or involuntarily, or terminating the trust 
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with respect to the administration and distribution of trust property will 
be respected is not, however, limited to circumstances raising those 
issues, but also arises in a variety of others that are discussed in this 
Article. 
The Uniform Trust Code (the “UTC”)9 was promulgated in 2000.10 
As “the first comprehensive national codification of the law of trusts,”11 
it provides an excellent opportunity to examine current thinking on how 
the balance should be struck between the property rights of settlors12 
who wish to control the future enjoyment of their property by others, and 
the interests of beneficiaries when those interests conflict, or are 
perceived by the beneficiaries to conflict, with the settlor-imposed 
restrictions.13 The purpose of this Article is to engage in that 
 
before the date specified for termination by the settlor. See Alexander, supra note 1, at 1201-08. By 
contrast, English law generally has treated beneficial interests in trusts as property belonging to, and 
subject to the control of, the trust’s beneficiaries. Id.  See generally Ronald Chester, Modification 
and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 
35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 697, 709-14 (2001) [hereinafter Chester, Modification and 
Termination]; Ronald Chester & Sarah Reid Ziomek, Removal of Corporate Trustees Under the 
Uniform Trust Code and Other Current Law: Does a Contractual Lense Help Clarify the Rights of 
Beneficiaries?, 67 MO. L. REV. 241, 258 (2002). According to Professors Dukeminier and 
Johanson, “in England and some of the Commonwealth countries. . ., after the settlor’s death, the 
trust is regarded as the beneficiaries’ property, not as the settlor’s property – and the dead hand 
continues to rule only by the sufferance of the beneficiaries.”  JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. 
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 651 (6th ed. 2000). 
 9. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 101-1106 (2000). 
 10. The UTC was amended in 2001, 2003, 2004, and 2005. 
 11. UNIF. TRUST CODE, Prefatory Note (2004). For a suggestion that even in states without 
substantial trust law, “a case may be made for letting trust law evolve as case-by-case common 
law,” see Practical Drafting (U.S. Trust Co. of NY) 7655 (April 2004). For a discussion 
questioning the wisdom of attempting to achieve uniformity in state laws generally, see David A. 
Thomas, Restatements Relating to Property: Why Lawyers Don’t Really Care, 38 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 655 (2004). 
 12. With respect to the threshold question of who is to be treated as a “settlor” under the 
UTC, the term is defined with reference to the creators of, or contributors of property to a trust.  
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(15) (2004). The definition does not address other circumstances in which 
a person is in substance, if not in form, the transferor of property to the trust, although its comment 
notes that if one person funds a trust and another executes its instrument as its ‘settlor,’ the former 
will be treated as the settlor of the trust. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. (2004). For a discussion of 
such circumstances, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. f (2003); Powell, supra note 
3, at 134. For a recent case on this question in the context of a claim by a provider of public benefits 
for reimbursement from a trust nominally established by the beneficiary’s mother, see Hertsberg 
Trust v. Dep’t of Mental Health, 578 N.W.2d 289 (Mich. 1998). Presumably, the substance over 
form analysis for determining the settlor(s) of a trust will be followed in a jurisdiction adopting the 
UTC under § 106, which provides that “[t]he common law of trusts and principles of equity 
supplement this [Code], except to the extent modified by this [Code] or another statute of this 
State.” See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 (2004). 
 13. As discussed infra at note 31 a trust settlor’s imposing restrictions and limitations on trust 
property may be motivated not by a desire to control the enjoyment of the property by the 
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examination. 
A unique feature of the UTC14 is that while it generally provides 
default rules that apply only if and to the extent the settlor does not 
provide otherwise in the instrument,15 the settlor’s ability to override the 
UTC’s rules is expressly limited by fourteen mandatory rules16 that will 
apply regardless of the settlor’s intent to the contrary.17  Although the 
 
beneficiaries, but by the desire to protect the beneficiaries while simultaneously giving them 
substantial control over the property. 
 14. As noted by Professor David English, the UTC’s Reporter, prior to the UTC, neither the 
Restatements, treatise writers, nor state legislatures had attempted to describe the trust law 
principles that the settlor cannot control. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): 
Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 155 (2002) [hereinafter English, 
Significant Provisions]. 
 15. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a) (2004). 
 16. UTC § 105(b) provides: 
(b) The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this [Code] except: 
(1) the requirements for creating a trust; 
(2) the duty of a trustee to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and 
purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries; 
(3) the requirement that a trust and its terms be for the benefit of its beneficiaries, and 
that the trust have a purpose that is lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to 
achieve; 
(4) the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under Sections 410 through 416; 
(5) the effect of a spendthrift provision and the rights of certain creditors and assignees 
to reach a trust as provided in [Article] 5; 
(6) the power of the court under Section 702 to require, dispense with, or modify or 
terminate a bond; 
(7) the power of the court under Section 708(b) to adjust a trustee’s compensation 
specified in the terms of the trust which is unreasonably low or high; 
[(8) the duty under Section 813(b)(2) and (3) to notify qualified beneficiaries of an 
irrevocable trust who have attained 25 years of age of the existence of the trust, of the 
identity of the trustee, and of their right to request trustee’s reports;] 
[(9) the duty under Section 813(a) to respond to the request of a [qualified] beneficiary 
of an irrevocable trust for trustee’s reports and other information reasonably related to 
the administration of a trust;] 
(10) the effect of an exculpatory term under Section 1008; 
(11) the rights under Sections 1010 through 1013 of a person other than a trustee or 
beneficiary; 
(12) periods of limitation for commencing a judicial proceeding; [and] 
(13) the power of the court to take such action and exercise such jurisdiction as may be 
necessary in the interests of justice [; and 
(14) the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court and venue for commencing a proceeding 
as provided in Sections 203 and 204]. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (2004). 
 17. See generally John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1105 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules]. Professor Langbein, a member of the 
UTC’s drafting committee, divides many of the UTC’s mandatory rules into intent-defeating and 
intent-serving rules, and characterizes many others as rules of general application. Id. at 1105-07. 
The rules of general application are said to “rest on self-evident principles of legal process that are 
broadly shared with the rest of private law.” Id. at 1107. Included are those (i) empowering the court 
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UTC’s mandatory rules serve as an important focus of this Article, the 
issue of the extent to which the settlor’s intent will be respected under 
the UTC arises in other contexts that also are analyzed.18 
II.  THE DEMISE OF THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES AND THE 
EXPANSION OF THE RULES FOR THE MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION 
OF TRUSTS 
A.  Introduction 
Almost 90 years ago, Professor Scott characterized the common 
law Rule Against Perpetuities as “perhaps the most sweeping and the 
most important limitation on the power to control property after death.”19 
Under the Rule, “[n]o interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not 
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the 
interest.”20 While the Rule does not directly limit the duration of trusts, it 
indirectly does so because after the expiration of the perpetuities period, 
 
to correct mistakes by reforming the instrument (§ 105(b)(4)), to require or waive bond (§ 
105(b)(6)), and to act as necessary in the interests of justice (§ 105(b)(13)), and (ii) setting 
limitations periods (§ 105(b)(12)), establishing rules of jurisdiction and venue (§ 105(b)(14)), 
protecting the rights of creditors (§ 105(b)(5)) and third parties who deal with the trustee (§ 
105(b)(11)), and prohibiting the establishment of trusts for illegal purposes (§ 105(b)(3)). Id. at 
1107 n.7-10 and accompanying text. The mandatory rules Professor Langbein characterizes as 
intent-defeating are those requiring trusts to be for the benefit of their beneficiaries (§ 105(b)(3)) 
and those requiring that courts have the ability to modify or terminate trusts (§§ 105(b)(4) and (7)). 
Id. at 1107-19. Finally, the mandatory rules with respect to creating trusts (§ 105(b)(1)), requiring 
the trustee to act in good faith (§ 105(b)(2)), limiting exculpation clauses (§ 105(b)(10)), and 
requiring the trustee to keep the beneficiaries informed (§§ 105(b)(8) and (9)) are characterized by 
Professor Langbein as intent-serving. Id. at 1119-26. 
 18. Among the limitations on the ability of settlors to exert dead-hand control over trust 
property that are not addressed by the UTC are the right of a surviving spouse to elect to receive a 
statutory share of a deceased spouse’s estate; the rights of a surviving spouse and children to a 
family allowance, exempt tangible personal property, and a homestead allowance; the rule against 
perpetuities; wealth transfer taxes; and the enforceability of no-contest clauses. 
 19. Austin W. Scott, Control of Property by the Dead. II., 65 U. PA. L. REV. 632, 639 (1917) 
[hereinafter Scott, Control of Property II]. 
 20. JOHN C. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942). Note that this 
classic statement of the Rule is inaccurate with respect to contingent interests created by the settlor 
of a revocable trust. As to such interests, the validity of the interest is measured not from the date 
the interest is created, but rather from the date the trust becomes irrevocable, which usually occurs 
at the settlor’s death.  See ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES 289 n.1 
(3d ed. 2003). For a brief summary of the historical development of the Rule, see THOMAS F. 
BERGIN & PAUL G. HASKELL, PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 179 (2d ed. 
1984). For an explanation of how it operates, see Carolyn Burgess Featheringill, Understanding the 
Rule Against Perpetuities: A Step-By-Step Approach, 13 CUMB. L. REV. 161 (1982). 
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the beneficiaries may terminate the trust regardless of its terms.21 
Although the common law Rule Against Perpetuities was the subject of 
two significant reforms during the latter part of the twentieth century – 
the development of the wait and see doctrine and the promulgation and 
adoption of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities by 
approximately half the states22 – “[n]either reform embodied any 
intention to free the dead hand of age-old restrictions; to the contrary, 
both shared that central policy of the Rule.”23 
Since 1986, however, at least 17 states have, in one form or 
another, eliminated or reduced restrictions on the duration of trusts.24 
Their motivation to do so was not based on a determination that the 
underlying policies of the Rule25 no longer justified it.26 Rather, the 
 
 21. AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 62.10 (4th 
ed. 1987); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. a (2003). 
 22. Jesse Dukeminier and James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. REV. 
1303, 1305-11 (2003). See also W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: What Legislatures, Courts and 
Practitioners Can Do About the Follies of the Rule, 13 KAN. L. REV. 351 (1965). For a list of many 
articles that contributed to the debate over perpetuities reform, see Adam J. Hirsch and William K.S. 
Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L. J. 1 n.4 (1992). 
 23. Dukeminier and Krier, supra note 22, at 1311. 
 24. Id. at 1314.  Many such states have conditioned the Rule not applying on the trust 
instrument giving the trustee the power of sale. Id. 
 25. For a summary of those policies, see Jesse Dukeminier, A Modern Guide to Perpetuities, 
74 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1868-69 (1986).  According to Professor Dukeminier: 
The Rule has three basic purposes: (1) to limit “dead hand” control over the property, 
which prevents the present generation from using the property as it sees fit; (2) to keep 
property marketable and available for productive development in accordance with 
market demands; and (3) to curb trusts, which can protect wealthy beneficiaries from 
bankruptcies and creditors, decrease the amount of risk capital available for economic 
development, and after a period of time and change in circumstances, tie up the family in 
disadvantageous and undesirable arrangements. 
Id. 
 26. For arguments to that effect, to one degree or another, see Dukeminier and Krier, supra 
note 22, at 1319-39; Macey, supra note 6, at 307-08; and LEWIS M. SIMES, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS 253-55 (2d ed. 1966). While Simes concluded that concerns over the 
marketability of property do not justify the Rule – because the trustee typically has the power to sell 
trust assets and reinvest the proceeds – he believed the Rule was necessary “to strike a fair balance 
between the desires of members of the present [and] succeeding generations.” Id. at 58. Professor 
Langbein, while agreeing with Simes that the Rule is not needed to promote alienability of land, 
characterizes Simes’ rationale for retaining the Rule as “a slogan, not an explanation.” Langbein, 
Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1110 n.33. Similarly, Professor Alexander characterizes the 
argument that it is necessary to balance the interests of the current owner who wants to control 
property indefinitely with those of the future owner, who wants his or her property to be free from 
dead hand control, as “either tautological or so vague as to be meaningless.” Alexander, supra note 
1, at 1257. For an argument that perpetuities policy should take into consideration the qualitative 
nature of dead hand restrictions settlors may attempt to impose, see Hirsch and Wang, supra note 
22. For a recent survey of policy arguments for and against repeal of the Rule, see Tye J. Klooster, 
Recent Development, Are the Justifications for the Rule against Perpetuities Still Persuasive?, 30 
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driving force behind such efforts has been the desire to attract trust 
business by assisting settlors, beneficiaries, and trustees in avoiding or 
minimizing wealth transfer taxes.27 Whatever the motivation, the demise 
of the Rule leaves settlors free, at least theoretically, to rule from the 
grave forever.28 
An obvious drawback to allowing dead hand control is that over 
time, circumstances will change in ways that settlors did not, and often 
could not, have foreseen or addressed in the terms of the trusts they 
create.29 As many have noted, the problem of dead hand control has been 
 
AM. C. TR. EST. COUNS. J. 95 (2004). 
 27. See Dukeminier and Krier, supra note 22, at 1314-15, 1317, 1327-28; Ira Mark Bloom, 
The GST Tax Tail is Killing the Rule Against Perpetuities, 87 TAX NOTES 569, 571-72 (2000); Joel 
C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends—An Essay, 35 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the 
Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097 (2003). Professor Leach 
characterized what may have been a similarly motivated judicial decision by an Ohio court, Smyth v. 
Cleveland Trust Co., 179 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1961), well before the current wave of anti-Rule 
legislative actions, as “just a teeny-weeny bit sordid.” W. BARTON LEACH, PROPERTY LAW 
INDICTED 50-51 (1967). 
 28. With the increase in the amount of property that can pass free of federal estate and 
generation skipping tax under the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 
(“the Act”), Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 38 (2001), and the possibility that the repeal of the federal 
estate tax that will occur in 2010 under the Act will be made permanent, the amount of wealth a 
settlor can control in perpetuity in a jurisdiction without the Rule is much greater than was the case 
prior to the Act. See Brian Layman, Comment, Perpetual Dynasty Trusts: One of the Most Powerful 
Tools in the Estate Planner’s Arsenal, 32 AKRON L. REV. 747 (1999). See also SIMES, supra note 4, 
at 56-7 (arguing that undue concentrations of wealth can best be combated by tax legislation, rather 
than by perpetuity rules); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1327 (“If family dynasties are to be 
prevented, only the federal government, through income and death taxes, can do it.”). But see 
RONALD CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH AND SOCIETY 127 (1982) (arguing that because wealth 
transfer tax laws have not prevented huge concentrations of wealth, the Rule is the best weapon for 
limiting dynastic trusts). Note that while the Act significantly increases the amount of wealth a 
decedent may leave free of federal estate and generation skipping tax (and indeed provides for the 
repeal of those taxes during 2010), it limits the amount of otherwise taxable gifts a donor may make 
free of the federal gift tax to $1 million, thus discouraging the wealthy from making lifetime 
transfers of more than that amount. 
Although facilitating tax planning to attract trust business may be the driving force behind 
many states’ recent legislation permitting dynasty trusts, such trusts apparently are being used by 
settlors for a variety of other reasons, including protecting trust assets from claims of beneficiaries’ 
creditors and ex-spouses, preventing beneficiaries from leaving their inheritances to persons outside 
the family or wasting their inheritances through extravagant spending, providing professional asset 
management, and encouraging beneficiaries to be productive and hardworking members of society. 
See Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2005). 
 29. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1327-35. In the context of the Rule having 
been fashioned to allow settlors to control property during their lifetimes and the lifetimes of those 
family members they know, but not beyond, Sir Arthur Hobhouse noted that, with respect to the 
latter, “the wisest judgment is constantly baffled by the course of events.” ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE 
DEAD HAND 188 (1880) (cited in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 gen. notes on clause (c) 
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exacerbated by the demise of the Rule and the increased use of perpetual 
trusts.30 According to Professor English, the UTC Reporter, “[d]ue to the 
increasing use in recent years of long-term trusts, there is a need for 
greater flexibility in the restrictive rules that apply concerning when a 
trust may be terminated or modified other than as provided in the 
instrument.”31 The UTC, consistent with a modern trend in American 
trust law,32 responds to that need in a variety of ways that are designed to 
enhance flexibility, but to do so “consistent with the principle that 
preserving the settlor’s intent is paramount.”33 
 
and cmts. i-i(2)). Further, the inability to foresee the course of future events, of course, is not limited 
to those affecting beneficiaries born after the creation of the trust. For an account of the case of 
Lady Mountbatten, which vividly makes that point, see LEACH, supra note 27, at 32-33. The case is 
used to support Professor Leach’s conclusion that: 
the more one conducts law practice in this field – estates and trusts – the more one 
realizes the importance of maintaining flexibility in these dispositive instruments, for no 
one can possibly foresee, even before the atomic age, the consequences which may ensue 
to disrupt what the poet called ‘the best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men.’ 
Id. at 34. For a discussion of the development of charitable trust law to address such problems as the 
administration of the trust established by Benjamin Franklin for the training of apprentices after 
apprentices disappeared from American society, see Mark Sidel, Law, Philanthropy and Social 
Class: Variance Power and the Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1145 (2003). 
 30. See, e.g., SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 21, at § 333.8 (2003 cumulative supplement); 
Chester, Modification and Termination, supra note 8, at 700; English, Significant Provisions, supra 
note 14, at 169; Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 658; Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An 
Instrumentalist Theory of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1273, 1280. Because, without the Rule, trusts “can endure indefinitely, or for absurdly long 
periods of time,” it has been argued that “being able to modify or terminate some such venerable 
trusts seems almost self-evidently desirable.” SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 21, at § 333.8 (2003 
cumulative supplement). Professors Dukeminier and Krier characterize the demise of the Rule and 
the resulting allowance of perpetual trusts as “one of the most significant developments of the late 
twentieth century,” and criticize the UTC for not including different modification and termination 
rules for such trusts. Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1331.  Their proposed alternatives are 
far-reaching and include granting the trust beneficiaries — after the deaths of the income 
beneficiaries who were known to the settlor — (i) non-general powers of appointment to appoint the 
trust assets during life or at death to anyone except themselves, their estates, or the creditors of 
either, and (ii) powers to withdraw principal for health, education, support, or maintenance. Id. at 
1341. For a critical analysis of the Dukeminier and Krier proposals, see Tate, supra note 28. 
 31. English, Significant Provisions, supra note 14, at 169. Note, however, that the motivation 
of some settlors who create long-term trusts is not to exert dead hand control, but to avoid or 
minimize wealth transfer taxes and to protect the trust assets from the claims of the beneficiaries’ 
creditors. In such cases, the trust may be designed to give the beneficiaries (or settlor-designated 
“trust protectors”) as much control as possible, without jeopardizing the accomplishment of those 
objectives. See Gideon Rothschild, More Clients Should Choose Trusts, TR. & EST. 32-34 (March 
2004). For a discussion of how much variety and uncertainty there is in the increasingly common 
use of trust protectors by settlors, see Edward C. Halbach, Uniform Acts, Restatements, and Trends 
in American Trust Law at Century’s End, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1877, 1916 (2000). 
 32. See Halbach, supra note 31, at 1899; SCOTT AND FRATCHER, supra note 21, at § 333.8 
(2003 cumulative supplement).  
 33. UNIF. TRUST CODE, Art. 4 gen. cmt. (2000). See generally Chester, Modification and 
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With respect to the early termination of trusts, for more than 100 
years American courts have respected the desires of settlors to control 
the use of property for their beneficiaries by prohibiting beneficiaries 
from prematurely terminating a trust without either (i) the settlor’s 
consent or (ii) a finding that the termination would not frustrate a 
material purpose of the settlor.34 With respect to the modification of 
trusts, under the equitable deviation doctrine, if circumstances 
unanticipated by the settlor occur such that administration of the trust in 
accordance with its terms would defeat or substantially impair the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, the court may modify the 
administrative terms of the trust to prevent that result.35 Several changes 
to the Claflin and equitable deviation doctrines have been made in the 
UTC. While those and other UTC provisions that provide greater 
flexibility with respect to the modification and termination of trusts were 
designed to be consistent with “the principle that the primary objective 
of trust law is to carry out the settlor’s intent,”36 they lessen the ability of 
 
Termination, supra note 8; English, Significant Provisions, supra note 14, at 169-80. For other 
alternatives for addressing problems created by the duration of perpetual trusts, see Dukeminier & 
Krier, supra note 22, at 1339-43.  Note that the enhanced flexibility provided by the UTC’s 
modification and termination provisions is not limited to long-term trusts. Rather, those provisions 
apply without regard to trust duration. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 410-417 (2004). For two cases 
decided under Kansas’ recently enacted version of the UTC that illustrate the need for such 
flexibility relatively soon after the creation of a trust, see In re Harris Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d 
1109 (Kan. 2003) and In re Estate of Somers, 89 P.3d 898, 905 (Kan. 2004). See also supra note 29. 
 34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). The origin of the doctrine was the 
case of Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). For an analysis of the development of the 
Claflin doctrine in its historical context, see Alexander, supra note 1; Chester, Modification and 
Termination, supra note 8, at 716-19. For discussions of a Missouri statute allowing modification or 
termination of a trust without regard to the settlor’s intent with the consent of the trust’s adult 
beneficiaries and a finding that the modification or termination “will benefit the disabled, minor, 
unborn and unascertained beneficiaries,” [MO. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000)] see Julia C. Walker, 
Get Your Dead Hands Off Me: Beneficiaries’ Right to Terminate or Modify a Trust Under the 
Uniform Trust Code, 67 MO. L. REV. 443, 445 (2002) and Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri’s Repeal 
of the Claflin Doctrine – New View of the Policy Against Perpetuities, 50 MO. L. REV. 805 (1985). 
In 1991, Virginia enacted a statute which appeared to allow trusts to be terminated for good cause 
upon the filing of a petition by a beneficiary, without regard to whether such a termination would 
contravene a material purpose of the settlor. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4 (1991); see also Jessica 
L. Lacey, The Dead Hand Loses Its Grip in Virginia: A New Rule for Trust Amendment and 
Termination?, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235 (1995). The statute was amended in 1996 to, among other 
things, prohibit modifications, including terminations, that materially impair the accomplishment of 
the trust purposes or adversely affect the interests of any beneficiary. See VA. CODE ANN. § 55-19.4 
(1996). For a discussion of the application of the Claflin doctrine in Texas, including a proposal for 
its relaxation “to reconcile a dead settlor’s intent with a living beneficiary’s needs,” see Eun C. Han, 
Premature Judicial Termination of Non-Spendthrift Trusts: Reconciling a Dead Settlor’s Intent with 
a Living Beneficiary’s Needs, 3 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 191, 208 (1996). 
 35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959). 
 36. English, Significant Provisions, supra note 14, at 169; see also Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 
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the settlor to control the enjoyment of trust property by its beneficiaries. 
B.  The Claflin Material Purpose Doctrine 
Under the Claflin doctrine, the beneficiaries37 of a trust may 
terminate it before the date specified for its termination by the settlor (i) 
if the settlor consents,38 or (ii) if doing so will not frustrate a material 
purpose of the trust.39 Thus, if the settlor is dead40 or does not consent, 
the beneficiaries may not terminate the trust prematurely if doing so 
would frustrate a material purpose of the settlor.41 As a result, 
identifying the settlor’s “material purposes” for the trust42 can be 
determinative in an effort by beneficiaries to terminate a trust before the 
date specified in the instrument for its termination. The UTC, as 
originally promulgated, did not address the material-purpose subject 
generally,43 but provided in section 411(c) that the inclusion of a 
 
660. 
 37. At common law, all beneficiaries must consent to a permitted early termination and none 
of them may be under a disability. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). Two changes 
to this requirement have been made by the UTC. First, if fewer than all of the beneficiaries consent 
to a proposed termination (or modification), the court nevertheless may approve the termination (or 
modification) if it is satisfied that: “(1) if all of the beneficiaries had consented, the trust could have 
been modified or terminated. . .; and (2) the interests of a beneficiary who does not consent will be 
adequately protected.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(e) (2004). Second, the UTC’s representation 
provisions facilitate obtaining the consent from beneficiaries who are minors, incapacitated, unborn, 
or unable to be located. See generally UNIF. TRUST CODE Art. 3 (2004). 
 38. Termination (or modification) with the consent of the settlor and all beneficiaries is 
permitted under UTC § 411(a), without regard to whether it would frustrate a material purpose of 
the trust, because the settlor and all of the beneficiaries are the only parties with an interest in the 
trust’s continuation. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. (2004). Because of concerns that the ability of 
the settlor, with the beneficiaries, to modify or terminate the trust under § 411(a) could cause the 
trust assets to be included in the estate of the settlor for federal estate tax purposes under § 2036 or § 
2038 of the Internal Revenue Code, § 411(a) was amended in 2004 to make it applicable on a 
prospective basis only and to require a court order for such a modification or termination. See 2004-
2005 Amendments to the Uniform Trust Code with Comments § 411 (Tentative Draft 3/1/2005). For 
a discussion of the § 411(a) federal estate tax issue that predates the 2004 amendments to § 411(a), 
see Richard B. Covey and Dan T. Hastings, Recent Developments in Estate, Gift and Income 
Taxation—2004, 39 HECKERLING INST. ON EST. PLAN. at 241-47 (2004) [hereinafter HECKERLING 
INSTITUTE]. 
 39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959). 
 40. If the settlor is incapacitated, in specified circumstances the UTC allows an agent, 
conservator, or guardian to consent on his or her behalf. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(a) (2004). 
 41. If termination would not frustrate a material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries may 
terminate it prematurely even if the settlor objects. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 gen. 
cmt. (2003). 
 42. For discussions of what constitutes a material purpose of a trust, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmts. d, e (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 cmts. f–o 
(1959); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1328. 
 43. In a comment, the UTC notes that demonstrating that a modification would not frustrate a 
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spendthrift provision in the instrument “is not presumed to constitute a 
material purpose of the trust.”44 The 2004 amendments to the UTC, 
however, bracket section 411(c) because several states that have enacted 
the Code have not agreed with the provision and have either deleted it or 
have revised it to state that a spendthrift provision is presumed to 
constitute a material purpose of the trust.45 In UTC-adopting 
 
material purpose of the trust does not require showing that the trust has no remaining function. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. (2004). Further, the comment to § 411 quotes from the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts: 
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a purpose generally 
requires some showing of a particular concern or objective on the part of the settlor, such 
as concern with regard to a beneficiary’s management skills, judgment, or level of 
maturity. Thus, a court may look for some circumstantial or other evidence indicating 
that the trust arrangement represented to the settlor more than a method of allocating the 
benefits of property among multiple intended beneficiaries, or a means of offering to the 
beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a particular advantage. Sometimes, of course, 
the very nature or design of a trust suggests its protective nature or some other material 
purpose. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d (2003). See also Halbach, supra note 31, at 1900 
(noting that a trend in beneficiary modification is to clarify and provide additional flexibility in the 
material purpose doctrine). Note that what would constitute a material purpose under the Second 
Restatement will not necessarily do so under the Third Restatement. For example, because of the 
material purpose doctrine, spendthrift trusts and trusts for the support of a beneficiary may not be 
terminated early by the trust’s beneficiaries under the Second Restatement, but may under the Third 
Restatement. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 cmts. l, m (1959), with 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e (2003). 
 44. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(c) (2000). The rationale for § 411(c) was that “spendthrift 
provisions are often added to instruments with little thought.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. 
(2000). For a discussion of how widespread spendthrift provisions are in trust instruments, along 
with citations to discussions of potential disadvantages in their use, see Alan Newman, The Rights 
of Creditors of Beneficiaries Under the Uniform Trust Code: An Examination of the Compromise, 
69 TENN. L. REV. 771, 777 n.36 (2002). In part because spendthrift clauses “may be included as a 
routine or incidental provision of a trust,” under the new Third Restatement, “the fact that a lawyer 
had explained the effect and advised the inclusion of a spendthrift provision is not alone sufficient 
to establish that it represents more than an advantage that the beneficiaries are free to relinquish by 
consenting to termination of the trust.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e (2003). 
 45. See 2004-2005 Amendments to the Uniform Trust Code with Comments § 411 (Tentative 
Draft 3/1/2005) (stating the reason for the bracketing of § 411(c), but also stating the view of the 
Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Trusts and Estates Acts “that the better approach is to enact 
subsection (c) in its original form”). Under the Kansas UTC, a spendthrift provision is presumed to 
constitute a material purpose of the trust, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-411(c) (2003) (revised in part by 
2004 Kan. Sess. Laws 158 (May 17, 2004)), and, in the absence of the presumption having been 
rebutted, prevents the premature termination of a trust. In re Estate of Somers, 89 P.3d 898, 905 
(Kan. 2004). While the trust in Somers was a charitable trust, to which UTC § 411 does not apply, 
the court, relying on the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and Professor Scott’s treatise, held that the 
material purpose limitation on the beneficiaries’ ability to terminate the trust was applicable to 
charitable as well as noncharitable trusts. Id. at 903-05. For a pre-UTC argument that any 
modification to the Claflin doctrine should not change the rule that the beneficiaries should not be 
able to terminate a spendthrift trust, see Gail Boreman Bird, Trust Termination: Unborn, Living, 
and Dead Hands – Too Many Fingers in the Trust Pie, 36 HASTINGS L. J. 563, 585-87 (1985). 
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jurisdictions in which spendthrift provisions are treated as constituting 
material purposes under pre-UTC law, the deletion of section 411(c) 
would likely continue that result.46 
While the UTC “was drafted in close coordination with the writing 
of the new Restatement (Third) of Trusts,”47 it does not follow a 
significant departure from the Claflin doctrine made by the Third 
Restatement. Under the new Restatement, if a termination or 
modification of the trust desired by all of the beneficiaries  
would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, the 
beneficiaries cannot compel its termination or modification except 
with the consent of the settlor or, after the settlor’s death, with 
authorization of the court if it determines that the reason(s) for 
termination or modification outweigh the material purpose.48 
As has been noted by others, the Restatement’s balancing test after the 
settlor’s death “weakens Claflin’s grip” on the administration of trusts in 
accordance with the settlor’s stated intent.49 
 
 46. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 (2004) (stating that the common law of trusts supplements 
the UTC except to the extent the UTC or another state statute modifies it). 
 47. UNIF. TRUST CODE, Prefatory Note (2004). 
 48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65(2) (2003).  This provision allowing the 
beneficiaries, after the death of the settlor, to modify or terminate a trust even if doing so would be 
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, as long as the court finds that the reason or reasons 
for the modification or termination outweigh the material purpose, was not based on prior 
Restatements, but rather on a similar provision of the California Probate Code (CAL. PROB. CODE § 
15403(b) (West 1991)) that “ha[d] apparently proved useful and noncontroversial in California 
since enactment in 1990.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d, reporter’s note 
(2003). For an argument, in the context of property law, that the change in the role of Restatements 
from reporters of existing law to catalysts for reform has significantly weakened their force and 
effect, see Thomas, supra note 11, at 664. According to Professor Thomas, 
Often in a general law practice, the lawyers’ efforts regarding substantive law center on 
finding helpful precedent among the case decisions from the courts of the forum 
state. . . . Lawyers have little interest in universal pronouncements from distant scholars, 
except as advisory authority in cases of first impression in that jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 49. Chester & Ziomek, supra note 8, at 255. The Restatement addresses the wisdom of the 
Claflin doctrine and its limitation of it through the balancing test of § 65(2) in three ways.  First, it 
quotes language from the Claflin decision emphasizing the policy of effecting the settlor’s intent.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d, reporter’s note (2003). Second, it discusses the 
contrary English view, as set forth in Saunders v. Vautier, 4 Beav. 115 (1841), under which 
beneficiaries holding the entire beneficial interest may terminate a trust before the date specified by 
the settlor, without regard to an intention of the settlor to the contrary.  Id.  Finally, it summarizes an 
American case, Ambrose v. First Nat’l Bank, 482 P.2d 828 (Nev. 1971), in which the court allowed 
the sole beneficiary of a trust to terminate it early after the settlor’s death, in part because of “a 
strong public policy against restraining one’s use and disposition of property in which no other 
person has an interest. . . .” Id.  Professor Sitkoff notes both an advantage of the Claflin doctrine to 
beneficiaries as a whole – that “it increases the willingness of grantors to create a trust in the first 
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C.  The Settlor’s Ability to Preclude a Premature Termination 
One of the mandatory rules of the UTC that the settlor may not 
override is “the power of the court to modify or terminate a trust under 
Sections 410 through 416.”50 Prior to its amendment in 2004, section 
411(a) allowed the settlor and the beneficiaries to modify or terminate a 
trust without court involvement.51 Accordingly, in states that have 
enacted the pre-2004 version of section 411(a), it appears that at the time 
of creation of a trust, the settlor can preclude subsequent modifications 
or terminations by the settlor and all of the beneficiaries.52 While they 
are the only parties with an interest in the trust,53 the trustee has standing 
to object to a proposed modification or termination,54 and it is clear 
under section 105(a) that the terms of the trust control its administration, 
without regard to provisions of the UTC to the contrary, except as 
specified in the fourteen mandatory rules of section 105(b). 
As amended in 2004, however, an alternative for section 411(a) 
provides, in part: “If, upon petition, the court finds that the settlor and all 
beneficiaries consent to the modification or termination of an irrevocable 
trust, the court shall enter an order approving the modification or 
termination even if the modification or termination is inconsistent with a 
material purpose of the trust.”55 The question raised is whether, in a 
jurisdiction that has enacted this version of section 411(a), the settlor is 
foreclosed from prohibiting a later section 411(a) modification or 
termination.56 Because such a modification or termination could only be 
made upon approval by the court, it arguably would constitute a 
modification or termination by the court within the meaning of UTC 
 
place” – and a disadvantage: that it “entrenches the trustee and locks in a certain minimal level of 
beneficiary-trustee agency costs.” Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 659-60. From a different perspective, 
Professor Chester argues for the rejection of the Claflin doctrine: “The living, providing they are 
legally interested parties and can all agree, should be able to bring to an end an individual’s estate 
plan when it no longer suits them, unless there remains some need for ‘guardianship-like’ 
protection.” CHESTER, supra note 28, at 140. 
 50. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (2004). 
 51. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(a) (2000). 
 52. While doing so obviously would limit flexibility, a settlor with serious concerns about the 
estate tax risks posed by § 411(a) might nevertheless choose to do so. See supra note 38. 
 53. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(a) cmt. (2004). 
 54. Id. 
 55. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(a) (2004). 
 56. Instances in which a settlor would want to do so presumably would be rare. Examples 
might include a settlor whose concern over the § 411(a) estate tax risk is not alleviated by the rubber 
stamp role of the court under amended § 411(a), see supra note 38, or a settlor who established a 
trust for the benefit of children in connection with a divorce from an ex-spouse who successfully 
insisted on the settlor and the children not having the ability to terminate the trust prematurely. 
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section 105(b)(4) that the settlor could not override.57 The argument to 
the contrary, however, is that the alternative version of section 411(a) 
still allows the settlor and the beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust 
at will, as it directs the court to approve the modification or termination, 
regardless of whether it violates a material purpose of the trust, if the 
court finds that the settlor and all of the beneficiaries have consented to 
the modification or termination. In other words, because the court has no 
discretion with respect to a section 411(a) modification or termination to 
which the settlor and the beneficiaries consent, such a modification or 
termination in substance is being made not by the court, within the 
meaning of section 105(b)(4), but instead by the settlor and the 
beneficiaries, in which case the settlor can override their ability to do so. 
Under section 411(b), the beneficiaries of a noncharitable trust may 
terminate or modify it “if the court concludes that continuance of the 
trust is not necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust,” or 
that “modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the 
trust.”58 Presumably, the requirement that the court make such a finding 
means that a section 411(b) termination or modification is within the 
mandatory rule of section 105(b)(4). If so, the settlor may not override 
the ability of the beneficiaries, upon the requisite finding by the court, to 
modify or terminate the trust under section 411(b). A settlor who desired 
to do so, however, could explicitly state in the terms of the trust that any 
modification or premature termination by the beneficiaries would violate 
a material purpose of the trust,59 in which case it would be unlikely that 
the court would make the material purpose finding necessary for a 
section 411(b) modification or termination. 
D.  The Equitable Deviation Doctrine 
Under the traditional equitable deviation doctrine, if circumstances 
unanticipated by the settlor occur, the court may modify the 
administrative terms of the trust, but only to prevent the unanticipated 
circumstances from defeating or substantially impairing the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.60 The UTC counterpart, 
 
 57. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (2004). 
 58. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) (2004). 
 59. For an example of such a provision, see Steven M. Fast, Christiana N. Gianopulos,& 
Carolyn B. Martino, Drafting to Excess, in REPRESENTING ESTATE AND TRUST BENEFICIARIES AND 
FIDUCIARIES, 109, 129-30 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jul. 17-18, 2003), available at WL, SJ001 
ALI-ABA 109. 
 60. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167(1) (1959). For a discussion of two cases in 
which the unanticipated circumstances doctrine has been applied to modify dispositive trust 
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section 412(a), does not include that limitation. Rather, it conditions a 
modification (or termination) for unanticipated circumstances61 on the 
modification (or termination) “further[ing] the purposes of the trust.”62 A 
recent case from Kansas, under its recently adopted version of the UTC63 
illustrates the effect this difference can have. In re Estate of Somers 
involved a trust initially funded with approximately $120,000 in the late 
1950s that grew to some $3,500,000 in value by 1991.64 The settlor’s 
two grandchildren were beneficiaries of the trust; each was to receive 
distributions of $100 per month for life.65 Upon the grandchildren’s 
deaths, the trust assets were to be distributed to a charity.66 Relying on 
Kansas’ version of section 412(a), the court determined that the 
tremendous increase in the value of the trust was a circumstance the 
settlor did not anticipate, and that the distribution of some $3,000,000 to 
the charity before the grandchildren’s deaths, with $500,000 retained in 
the trust to provide for the monthly payments to the grandchildren, 
furthered the purposes of the trust.67 Had the unanticipated 
circumstances doctrine instead required a finding that continuation of the 
trust on its existing terms would have defeated or substantially impaired 
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, the distribution may not 
have been approved.68 
A fundamental change made by the UTC to the traditional 
unanticipated-circumstances, equitable deviation doctrine is that section 
412 expands it to apply to dispositive as well as administrative 
provisions.69 In doing so, however, it respects the settlor’s intent in 
 
provisions, see Macey, supra note 6, at 300-01 (discussing Donnelly v. Nat’l Bank of Wash., 179 
P.2d 333 (Wash. 1947) and In re Estate of Kerber, 336 N.Y.S.2d 400 (N.Y. Sur. 1972)). 
 61. With respect to what can constitute unanticipated circumstances for § 412 purposes, it is 
not necessary that the circumstances arise after the trust was created, as long as they were 
unanticipated by the settlor. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 cmt. (2004). 
 62. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2004). 
 63. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58A-412(a) (2003). 
 64. Somers, 89 P.3d at 901. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 906. 
 68. Somers illustrates that the UTC’s formulation of the unanticipated circumstances doctrine 
in § 412(a) – conditioning a modification under it on whether it will further the purposes of the trust 
– undermines to a significant extent a limitation of the doctrine under the Second Restatement. 
Under it, the court will not “permit or direct the trustee to deviate from the terms of the trust merely 
because such deviation would be more advantageous to the beneficiaries than a compliance with 
such direction.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 cmt. (1959). For criticism of the Second 
Restatement position, see Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1328-29. 
 69. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2004). Section 412(a) is not the first trust statute to 
allow the modification of dispositive terms of a trust in response to unanticipated circumstances. See 
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several ways. First, beneficiaries may not effect a modification or 
termination based on the occurrence of unanticipated circumstances; 
rather, court action is required.70 Second, the court’s authorization to do 
so is limited to situations in which the “modification or termination will 
further the purposes of the trust.”71 Finally, “[t]o the extent practicable, 
the modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable 
intention.”72 The UTC comment73 to this section notes that the expanded 
equitable deviation doctrine “may be used to modify administrative or 
dispositive terms due to the failure to anticipate economic change or the 
incapacity of a beneficiary.”74 The example provided is a modification 
“to increase support of a beneficiary . . . if the beneficiary has become 
unable to provide for support due to poor health or serious injury.”75 
The court’s power under section 412(a) – to modify or terminate 
the trust if, because of circumstances the settlor did not anticipate, doing 
so would further the purposes of the trust – is a mandatory one that the 
settlor may not override.76 A settlor concerned about the possibility of an 
unwanted section 412(a) modification or termination could attempt to 
 
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409 (West 1991), discussed in Chester, Modification and Termination, supra 
note 8, at 701-02. While the change of circumstances doctrine typically is used to authorize 
modifications, its application under § 412(a) to terminations as well as modifications is consistent 
with the Second Restatement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 336 (1959). 
 70. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2004). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. As noted by Professor Chester, the UTC’s trust modification provisions can be viewed 
as “‘settlor friendly.’ Flexibility in changed circumstances undoubtedly would appeal to many dead 
settlors if they could be brought back to life.” Chester, Modification and Termination, supra note 8, 
at 728. See also Appeal of Harrell, 801 P.2d 852 (Or. Ct. App. 1990) (denying a request for 
modification to convert an incapacitated beneficiary’s share of a trust to a supplemental needs trust). 
 73. With respect to the effect of the UTC’s comments, the comment to § 106 provides: “The 
statutory text of the Uniform Trust Code is . . . supplemented by these Comments, which, like the 
Comments to any Uniform Act, may be relied on as a guide for interpretation.” UNIF. TRUST CODE 
§ 106 cmt. (2004). 
 74. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 cmt. (2004). 
 75. Id. See generally LEACH, supra note 27, at 36-40 (favoring courts having and exercising a 
power to modify in such circumstances and noting that while such problems can and should be 
solved by proper drafting, “let’s face it, many members of our profession who draw wills for their 
clients are mere dabblers in the field. Our courts should assume the power to correct these follies, 
and our legislatures should give their blessing.”). See also Paul G. Haskell, Justifying the Principle 
of Distributive Deviation in the Law of Trusts, 18 HASTINGS L. J. 267 (1967). For a contrary view 
arguing that the presumed intent of the settlor that underlies such modifications “is nothing more 
than a fiction, justifying judicial intervention,” see Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of 
Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES, AND FAMILY PROPERTY 124 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977). 
 76. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (2004). Unlike under the Third Restatement, if the 
trustee knows of unanticipated circumstances that would warrant a modification under § 412(a), the 
UTC does not obligate the trustee to petition the court for modification. Compare RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66(2) (2003), with UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412 cmt. (2004). 
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avoid one by including in the terms of the trust a recitation of 
circumstances the settlor anticipated.77 If the settlor does so in specific 
terms, however, it is likely that, over time, circumstances would arise 
that the settlor had not provided for in the instrument. On the other hand, 
general statements of the kinds of circumstances the settlor anticipated, 
and with respect to which he or she would not want the trust modified or 
terminated, might not be specific enough to overcome an argument that a 
specific circumstance that had occurred was unanticipated. Thus, 
particularly for long-term and perpetual trusts, it may prove difficult – 
arguably, rightfully so – for settlors who do not want the court to modify 
or amend the trusts they create under the unanticipated circumstances 
doctrine to accomplish that objective under the UTC.78 
A second change under the UTC to the traditional equitable 
deviation doctrine for the modification of trusts is that it makes 
applicable to non-charitable trusts the UTC’s expansion79 of the cy pres 
doctrine that has traditionally been applicable only to charitable trusts.80 
 
 77. By contrast, such a recitation would not foreclose a modification of the administrative 
terms of the trust under § 412(b), because unanticipated circumstances are not required for § 412(b) 
modifications. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b) (2004).  
 78. Whether the law should allow perpetual and other long-term trusts is subject to 
considerable debate. For two recent discussions, see Tate, supra note 28, and Klooster, supra note 
26. The unanticipated circumstances doctrine blunts a common criticism of such trusts because it 
allows the court to address whether a trust should be continued on its existing terms in the face of 
unforeseen events. As a result, it should play an important role in minimizing the risk that, as 
circumstances change, a long-term trust will not operate as the settlor had expected and intended. It 
likely is not possible for a settlor to anticipate the circumstances that may arise in connection with 
the administration of a trust that lasts not just for decades, but for centuries. If the settlor includes in 
the instrument broad, general provisions that purport to anticipate a wide variety of possible 
circumstances that may arise, courts should be circumspect in allowing such provisions to bar them 
from exercising the power to modify or terminate under § 412(a). But if a settlor did, in fact, 
anticipate particular circumstances that occurred and intended that the trust be unaffected, that 
intention should rarely be overridden. See infra notes 152-179 and accompanying text (discussing 
the for-the-benefit-of-the-beneficiaries doctrine). 
In determining whether the settlor actually anticipated circumstances that have occurred, 
courts should consider not just a broad, general provision of the instrument that arguably refers to 
such circumstances, but also the nature of the circumstances that have occurred relative to those 
existing when the trust was created and the settlor’s knowledge of them. See  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
412 cmt. (2004). Given that the mandatory rule of § 412(a) permits modification or termination for 
unanticipated circumstances only if it “will further the purposes of the trust,” and requires any such 
modification or termination to “be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention,” UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2004), courts should be hesitant to foreclose application of the unanticipated 
circumstances doctrine when circumstances have changed significantly since the creation of the 
trust and the trust instrument includes a broad, general recitation of circumstances the settlor 
acknowledges might occur.  
 79. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. 
 80. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b) (2004). The comment to § 412(b) notes that it “does not 
have a direct precedent in the common law, but various states have insisted on such a measure by 
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Under section 412(b): “The court may modify the administrative terms 
of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be 
impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.”81 
Noteworthy about section 412(b) is that the court’s modification power 
under that section is not limited to modifications that would not be 
contrary to a material purpose of the trust, and does not require 
unanticipated circumstances.82 While it thus limits the Claflin doctrine, 
its reach is limited to administrative terms.83 
E.  Other Grounds for Modification or Termination of Private Trusts 
Under the UTC 
The additional flexibility the UTC provides with respect to the 
termination and modification of trusts is not limited to its relaxation of 
the Claflin doctrine, its expansion of the unanticipated circumstances 
doctrine, and its application of the cy pres doctrine to the administrative 
provisions of non-charitable trusts. For example, the UTC also 
authorizes the court to modify the terms of a trust to achieve the settlor’s 
tax objectives, so long as the modification is done “in a manner that is 
not contrary to the settlor’s probable intention.”84 Further, under section 
 
statute.” See also LEACH, supra note 27, at 44 (arguing that courts should apply cy pres to private, 
as well as charitable, gifts “to make sensible dispositions out of unwise” ones). Professor Chester 
argues that the relative ease with which courts traditionally could modify or terminate charitable 
trusts may be because they are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities, and that as private trusts 
increasingly become free of the constraints of the Rule, the powers that courts have to modify and 
terminate charitable trusts also should be available for private ones. Chester, Modification and 
Termination, supra note 8, at 724. 
 81. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b) (2004). 
 82. Because the court’s power to modify the administrative terms of a trust under § 412(b), 
which is mandatory under § 105(b)(4), is not dependent on a finding of unanticipated 
circumstances, a settlor may not avoid it by reciting in the instrument circumstances that would not 
be unanticipated.  Cf. supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 83. For a discussion of the lack of precision in distinguishing between administrative and 
substantive terms in the context of charitable trusts, see Alex M. Johnson, Limiting Dead Hand 
Control of Charitable Trusts: Expanding the Use of the Cy Pres Doctrine, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 353, 
380 (1999). 
 84. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 (2004). Because any tax savings usually will benefit the 
beneficiaries, but not the settlor, the UTC’s accommodation of tax-motivated modifications is an 
application of the principle that trusts are for the benefit of their beneficiaries. See Halbach, supra 
note 31, at 1887; infra notes 152-179 and accompanying text. For two practitioners’ views on the 
increasing need for trust reformations arising from “the complex and ever-changing maze of tax 
laws and investment vehicles that contemporary trustees must negotiate,” see David R. Hodgman & 
David C. Blickenstaff, Judicial Reformation of Trusts – The Drafting Tool of Last Resort, 28 EST. 
PLAN. 287 (June 2001). Whether a reformation under § 416 will be effective for federal tax 
purposes is dependent on federal, rather than state, law and may be ineffective with respect to a 
modification made after the taxing event. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 416 cmt. (2004). For that 
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415: 
The court may reform the terms of a trust, even if unambiguous, to 
conform the terms to the settlor’s intention if it is proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of the 
trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression 
or inducement.85 
Because the UTC applies to all express trusts,86 section 415 gives courts 
the same power to reform testamentary trusts that they traditionally have 
had with respect to inter vivos instruments.87 
In addition, the UTC’s small trust termination provision, section 
414, allows the trustee (with notice to qualified beneficiaries,88 but 
 
reason, when possible, practitioners frame proceedings to determine the operative effect of 
irrevocable trusts as construction actions to interpret ambiguous trust terms, rather than reformation 
proceedings to modify a trust’s terms. See Hodgman & Blickenstaff, supra. 
 85. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (2004). While this provision and an analogous one in the new 
Restatement of Property (RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 
(2002)) were intended to further the objective of giving effect to the settlor’s intent, in cases in 
which the settlor’s plan differs from society’s norms there is a danger that it actually will have the 
opposite effect because of the exercise of “bias by finding evidence of ‘mistake’ more readily in 
cases involving testators whose dispositive plans are unusual or unpalatable.” Pamela R. Champine, 
My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring and the Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 401 
(2001). For a recent case applying Kansas’ version of the UTC to approve the reformation and 
modification of a trust instrument, and discussing the distinction between the two, see In re Harris 
Testamentary Trust, 69 P.3d 1109 (Kan. 2003). 
 86. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 102 (2004). 
 87. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2004). For a current analysis of the law on curing 
drafting errors in dispositive instruments, see Martin L. Fried, The Disappointed Heir: Going 
Beyond the Probate Process to Remedy Wrongdoing or Rectify Mistake, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & 
TR. J. 357, 392-402 (2004). See also John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation of 
Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 521 
(1982). Note that with the exception of the mandatory rules of § 105(b), the “terms of the trust” 
govern its administration. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a) (2004). “Terms of a trust” is defined to 
mean manifestations of the settlor’s intent regarding the trust’s provisions, as expressed not only in 
the trust instrument, but also “as may be established by other evidence that would be admissible in a 
judicial proceeding.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(18) (2004). Examples of evidence that may not be 
considered in determining a term of the trust include evidence excluded under a jurisdiction’s 
statute of frauds or parol evidence rule. Id. cmt. 
 88. Whether a trust beneficiary is a “qualified beneficiary” is important for a variety of 
purposes under the UTC. Under the Code, a qualified beneficiary is a beneficiary 
who, on the date the beneficiary’s qualification is determined: 
(A) is a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal; 
(B) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if 
the interests of the distributees described in subparagraph (A) terminated on that  date; or 
(C) would be a distributee or permissible distributee of trust income or principal if 
the trust terminated on that date. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(12) (2004). Thus, generally, beneficiaries with remote remainder interests 
are not “qualified beneficiaries.” 
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without court involvement89) to terminate a trust with less than $50,000 
in assets90 if it determines that the trust is not large enough to justify the 
costs of administering it.91 Further, without regard to the size of the trust, 
if the court finds that the value of the trust is not sufficient to justify the 
cost of administering it, the court may terminate the trust,92 or remove 
and replace the trustee to reduce administrative costs.93 The UTC also 
allows the trustee, again with notice to qualified beneficiaries but 
without the court’s involvement, to combine two or more trusts into one, 
or divide a trust into two or more separate trusts, if doing so will “not 
impair rights of any beneficiary or adversely affect achievement of the 
purposes of the trust.”94 
F.  Modification or Termination of Charitable Trusts 
The UTC also makes several changes to the common law rules 
governing the modification or termination of charitable trusts. First, it 
eliminates the requirement of a finding that a settlor had a general 
charitable intent in order for the court to exercise its mandatory cy pres 
authority if a particular charitable purpose fails.95 As a result, unless the 
settlor explicitly provides for a reversion or another alternative 
disposition in such a case, the court is to “modify or terminate the trust 
by directing that the trust property be applied or distributed, in whole or 
in part, in a manner consistent with the settlor’s charitable purposes.”96 
This change is viewed as being consistent with the intent of most 
settlors.97 
 
 89. Because the mandatory rule of UTC § 105(b)(4) is with respect to the power of the court 
to modify or terminate a trust, the settlor could negate the ability of the trustee to terminate a small 
trust under § 414(a). See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(4) and 414(a) (2004). 
 90. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414 cmt. (2004). The $50,000 amount in § 414(a) is bracketed “to 
signal to enacting jurisdictions that they may wish to designate a higher or lower figure.” Id. 
 91. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414(a) (2004). 
 92. The settlor may not override this power of the court to terminate a trust. See UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 105(b)(4) (2004).  
 93. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 414(b) (2004). Having the power to terminate a small trust, of 
course, does not mean that it should be exercised: “Even if administrative costs may seem excessive 
in relation to the size of the trust, protection of the assets from beneficiary mismanagement may 
indicate that the trust be continued.” Id. cmt. 
 94. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 417 (2004). Note that trusts may be combined under § 417 even if 
their terms, including their dispositive provisions, are not identical. Id. cmt. Similarly, a single trust 
may be divided into two or more separate trusts “even if the trusts that result are dissimilar.” Id. 
 95. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 (2004). See generally CHESTER, supra note 28, at 116-21. 
 96. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a)(3) (2004). 
 97. See id. cmt.  See also English, Significant Provisions, supra note 14, at 179 n.165. 
Another intent-affirming change the UTC makes to the traditional rules governing charitable trusts 
is that it gives the settlor of such a trust standing to enforce it. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 410(b) (2004). 
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A related change, however, expressly overrides the settlor’s intent. 
If the settlor provides for a gift over to a non-charitable beneficiary if a 
charitable trust fails, under section 413(b), the UTC will enforce that gift 
only if the property is to revert to the settlor and he or she is then living, 
or if the gift over is to occur less than 21 years from the trust’s 
creation.98 If neither of those circumstances exists, the court is to 
exercise its cy pres authority and the settlor’s intent will be overridden.99 
This change from the common law was made because of “concerns 
about the clogging of title and other administrative problems caused by 
remote default provisions upon failure of a charitable purpose.”100 
Because section 413(b) is expressly made applicable only to gifts 
over to noncharitable beneficiaries,101 presumably a gift over to another 
charity would be respected without regard to how much time has elapsed 
since the trust was created. Alternatively, if section 413(b) nevertheless 
is applied to such a gift, presumably the charity the settlor named to 
receive the gift over would receive it anyway, because when the court 
applies cy pres, it is to do so “in a manner consistent with the settlor’s 
charitable purposes.”102 If the settlor has named an alternative charity to 
receive the property in the event of a failure of the initial charitable 
purpose, a distribution to that named charity should be most consistent 
with the settlor’s charitable purposes.103 
A third change the UTC makes to traditional charitable trust 
modification and termination rules is its expansion of the grounds for 
treating a charitable trust’s purposes as having failed, and thus triggering 
 
For an argument that a trust represents a deal between the settlor and the trustee with respect to the 
management of property for the beneficiaries that is the functional equivalent of a third-party-
beneficiary contract, and thus that the default rule should be that the settlor can enforce the trust (as 
that likely would have been the intent of the parties and included in the terms of the trust had they 
considered and addressed it), see John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 
105 YALE L. J. 625, 664 (1995).  See Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 666-69 (discussing a number of issues 
raised by the prospect of settlor standing to enforce trusts). 
 98. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (2004). Note that § 413(b) does not apply to gifts over to 
other charitable beneficiaries. See infra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
 99. Because the limitation on gifts over to non-charitable beneficiaries under § 413(b) is 
expressly made a limitation on the court’s cy pres authority under § 413(a), presumably § 105(b)(4) 
prohibits it from being waived by the settlor. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (2004). 
 100. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413 cmt. (2004). See also Ronald Chester, Cy Pres or Gift Over?: 
The Search for Coherence in Judicial Reform of Failed Charitable Trusts, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
41 (1989). 
 101. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(b) (2004) (stating that it applies to trusts that “would result 
in distribution of the trust property to a noncharitable beneficiary”). 
 102. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a)(3) (2004). 
 103. For a discussion of § 413 not addressing gifts over to charities, see Chester, Modification 
and Termination, supra note 8, at 708. 
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the court’s mandatory cy pres authority to modify the trust. At common 
law, the applicability of the cy pres doctrine was dependent on the 
particular charitable purpose having become impossible, impracticable, 
or illegal.104 To that list, the UTC adds “wasteful,”105 apparently to 
address “situations where the funds allocated to the particular charitable 
scheme far exceed what is needed.”106 While it may be arguable that 
settlors would not want their charitable trusts to be administered 
wastefully,107 allowing the terms of a charitable trust to be modified 
upon a judicial determination that its charitable purposes have become 
wasteful presumably often would be contrary to the settlor’s intent.108 
 
 104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959); Chester, Modification and 
Termination, supra note 8, at 706. 
 105. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a) (2004). 
 106. English, Significant Provisions, supra note 14, at 179 n.164. According to Professor 
Chester, the ground of wastefulness was added as a basis for applying cy pres in part in response to 
the case of In re Estate of Beryl H. Buck, the opinion in which, while not reported, is reproduced in 
In re Estate of Beryl H. Buck, 21 U.S.F. L. REV. 691 (1987). In Buck, the principal trust asset was 
approximately $9 million in value at the trust’s creation, but within four years it was sold for $260 
million. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 8, at 872-77. The trust was established for 
charitable, religious, and educational purposes in Marin County, California, the second-wealthiest 
county in the United States. Id. The foundation that administered the trust petitioned the court to 
exercise cy pres to expand the counties that could benefit from the trust to include other adjacent, 
less wealthy counties. Id. In rejecting the petition, the court noted that impracticability is a grounds 
for the application of cy pres, but held that: 
The cy pres doctrine should not be so distorted by the adoption of subjective, relative, 
and nebulous standards such as “inefficiency” or “ineffective philanthropy” to the extent 
that it becomes a facile vehicle for charitable trustees to vary the terms of a trust simply 
because they believe that they can spend the trust income better or more wisely 
elsewhere, or as in this case, prefer to do so. There is no basis in law for the application 
of standards such as “efficiency” or “effectiveness” to modify a trust, nor is there any 
authority that would elevate these standards to the level of impracticability. 
Buck, supra, at 752-53. Note that if UTC § 413 had governed in Buck, the petition for cy pres might 
still have been unsuccessful and would have required the court to determine if devoting all of the 
trust’s resources to accomplishing charitable, religious, and educational purposes in Marin County 
was “wasteful.” See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 413(a) (2004). 
 107. In Buck, the Trustee, relying at least in part on the unexpected, huge increase in the value 
of the trust estate, made such an argument. Buck, supra note 106, at 753-55 (acknowledging the 
Petitioner’s arguments as to wastefulness and stating that wastefulness should be distinguished from 
impracticability for purposes of applying cy pres to a trust). 
 108. Of course, to say that expanding the cy pres doctrine may override the settlor’s intent is 
not necessarily to say that the doctrine should not be expanded. For policy-oriented arguments that 
settlors should not be able to rule the administration of charitable trusts from the grave indefinitely, 
see Ronald Chester, Cy Pres: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 IND. L. J. 407, 425 (1979); Johnson, supra 
note 83; SIMES, supra note 4, at xix-xx; Scott, Control of Property II, supra note 19, at 654; and 
LEACH, supra note 27, at 47-48. For an argument to the contrary, see Chris Abbinante, Comment, 
Protecting “Donor Intent” in Charitable Foundations: Wayward Trusteeship and the Barnes 
Foundation, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1997). While allowing charitable trusts to be modified under 
the cy pres doctrine for wastefulness presents the possibility of a settlor’s intent being improperly 
overridden, circumstances may arise when a judicial power to modify a charitable trust whose 
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III.  THE SETTLOR’S ABILITY TO PROHIBIT THE TRANSFER OF THE 
BENEFICIARY’S INTEREST 
Historically, restraints imposed by the donor of property on its 
alienability by the donee generally were not valid.109 Beginning in the 
eighteenth century110 and continuing through the widespread acceptance 
of spendthrift trusts today, the settlor’s ability to prevent, or at least 
severely limit, the alienation of the beneficiary’s interest has become 
well established.111 While that generally is the case under the UTC,112 in 
mandatory rules the settlor cannot override,113 the UTC limits the 
settlor’s ability to prevent the alienation of the beneficiary’s interest in 
several ways. 
First, as in most non-UTC jurisdictions, a trust will be a spendthrift 
trust only if the settlor includes in the instrument language that manifests 
his or her intent to create a spendthrift trust.114 Second, as is also the case 
 
purpose has become wasteful is called for. To illustrate, if the charitable trust in Buck, supra note 
106, had been to provide care for stray animals in the Marin County animal shelter, and if the 
evidence were clear that such care could be perpetually provided for with an endowment of some 
fraction of the value the trust assets had grown to be, a cy pres standard limited to “unlawful, 
impracticable, or impossible to achieve” arguably would not allow a court to apply the doctrine to 
redirect the excess trust assets to other charitable needs, rather than using them to, for example, 
provide Marin County’s stray animals with luxurious private quarters, full-time, private caregivers, 
daily grooming, and weekly veterinarian visits. 
 109. See Powell, supra note 3, at 127. 
 110. Professor Powell’s explanation of the origin of the ability of donors to restrict transfers by 
donees is that: 
Wealthy mature Englishmen (not unlike wealthy and mature persons of other ancestries) 
had a core of common beliefs. First, they believed that their blooming daughters were 
pearls above price. Second, they believed that the chaps selected by their daughters as 
husbands were either scalawags, or, at best, less blessed with wisdom then [sic] they 
themselves were. Third, they believed it necessary to provide out of their accumulations 
for the security of their daughters and the progeny of their daughters. Fourth, they 
desired strongly to perpetuate the provided security against the possible blandishments or 
improvidence of the disturbed sons-in-law. 
  When one combined the common core of four beliefs above described with the fact 
that the class of wealthy and mature Englishmen largely overlapped the class of 
prominent English lawyers and judges, the judicial evolution of the ‘equitable separate 
property of married women’ became easily predictable. Under this doctrine property 
settled in trust could be made inalienable as to benefit by the married woman and, to 
make this effective, at a later date, unreachable by the creditors of either the fair 
beneficiary or her improvident spouse. 
Id. at 128 (footnote omitted). 
 111. See Newman, supra note 44, at 772 n.10. For a discussion of agency costs associated with 
honoring or not honoring the settlor’s dead hand control with respect to spendthrift restrictions on 
transfers by beneficiaries, see Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 675-77. 
 112. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502 (2004). 
 113. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(5) (2004). 
 114. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 501, 502(a), and 502(b) (2004). See also RESTATEMENT 
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in most non-UTC jurisdictions, the UTC does not allow the settlor to 
prevent creditors from reaching the interest, but to permit the beneficiary 
to voluntarily transfer it.115 Third, consistent with the Restatements, 
federal bankruptcy law, and existing law in many states,116 a spendthrift 
provision will not protect the beneficiary’s interest from the support 
claims of the beneficiary’s child, spouse, or former spouse.117 Fourth, 
also excepted from the bar of a spendthrift clause are (i) the claim of a 
judgment creditor who has provided services for the protection of the 
beneficiary’s interest in the trust, and (ii) a claim of the state or the 
United States, to the extent a statute of the state or federal law so 
provides.118 Fifth, consistent with the common law, but not with recent 
legislation in several states,119 regardless of whether the terms of the 
 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 cmt. b (2003) (“The settlor must manifest the intention to create a 
spendthrift trust. No particular form of wording is necessary for this purpose, as long as the requisite 
intention can be discerned from the terms of the trust.” (internal reference omitted)); David M. 
English, Is There a Uniform Trust Act in Your Future?, 14 PROB. & PROP. 25, 30 (Jan.-Feb. 2000) 
[hereinafter English, Trust Act in Your Future] (the title of Professor English’s article derives from 
the fact that earlier drafts of the UTC were titled the “Uniform Trust Act”).  By contrast, some states 
have made trusts spendthrift by statute, even if the instrument does not include a spendthrift 
provision, unless the transfer of beneficial interests is expressly authorized. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.5(a)(1) (McKinney 1992). 
Further, a few courts have implied a restraint on alienation with little or no express language 
in the instrument indicating such intent.  IIA SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 21, at 119-20; 
William S. Huff, Spendthrift Clauses: Legality and Effect on Post-Transfer Estate Planning, 
INSTITUTE ON ESTATE PLANNING ¶ 1202.4 (1984). For example, in Morrison v. Doyle, 582 N.W.2d 
237 (Minn. 1998), a beneficiary’s judgment creditors were prohibited from reaching the 
beneficiary’s trust interest even though the instrument did not include a spendthrift provision.  Id. at 
238.  The beneficiary was serving as the trustee, and as such, the beneficiary was to “pay the income 
and such amounts of the principal as the Trustee in its discretion may determine for the 
beneficiary’s education, support, health, and maintenance.” Id. at 239.  According to the court, that 
language was sufficient to create a spendthrift trust. Id. at 241. 
 115. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 502(a) (2004). According to Professor English, the UTC 
Reporter, “[t]he drafting committee concluded that it was undesirable as a matter of policy for a 
beneficiary to be able to transfer the beneficiary’s interest while at the same time denying the 
beneficiary’s creditors the right to reach the trust to satisfy their claims.” English, Trust Act in Your 
Future, supra note 114, at 30.  
 116. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. (2004). 
 117. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503(b) (2004). 
 118. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 503(b) and (c) (2004). The UTC does not include the common 
exception to spendthrift protection for the claims of those who have provided necessaries to the 
beneficiary. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b) (2003), with UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
503(b) (2004). The necessaries exception was omitted from the UTC because most cases in which 
such claims have been asserted “involve claims by governmental entities, which the drafters 
concluded are better handled by the enactment of special legislation.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 503 cmt. 
(2004). See also Newman, supra note 44, at 789-803. 
 119. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(a)-(b) (Michie 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 
3570-3576 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.010 (Michie 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 18-9.2 
(2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-6-14(a)(ii) (2004). Generally, subject to fraudulent transfer and 
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trust include a spendthrift provision, if the settlor retains a beneficial 
interest in an irrevocable trust, the settlor’s creditors may reach the 
maximum amount the trustee could distribute to or for the settlor’s 
benefit.120 
Irrespective of whether the settlor includes a spendthrift provision 
in the instrument, if the settlor makes the beneficiary’s right to receive 
distributions from the trust subject to the trustee’s discretion, the settlor 
probably intends that creditors of the beneficiary not be able to force 
distributions from the trust.121 The UTC respects that intention122 except 
with respect to support claims of the beneficiary’s child, spouse, or 
 
other limitations, these statutes allow settlors to establish irrevocable trusts in which they may retain 
a beneficial interest that their creditors may not reach. The effectiveness of such legislation to 
accomplish that objective, as well as the wisdom of attempting to do so, has been questioned by 
many. See, e.g., Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost – A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA 
L. REV. 1195 (2000); Randall J. Gingiss, Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 987 (1999); Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset Protection Trusts: Pallbearers to 
Liability, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 479 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: 
Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1042 (2000). For a contrary view, see 
Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive Perspectivces, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 83-92 (1995). 
 120. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(a)(2) (2004). If the settlor has reserved the ability to revoke 
the trust, all of its assets are subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
505(a)(1) (2004). For this purpose, a person holding a power of withdrawal over trust assets is 
treated as the settlor of a revocable trust, but only to the extent of the property subject to the power 
and only during the period the power may be exercised. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(1) (2004). 
To facilitate planning with Crummey and five or five powers, if the holder of the power allows it to 
lapse, or releases or waives it, the holder will thereafter be treated as the settlor of the trust only to 
the extent of the excess of the amount that could have been withdrawn over the greater of the annual 
exclusion amount of I.R.C. § 2503(b) or the 5 percent or $5,000 amount of I.R.C. § 2041(b)(2) or § 
2514(e). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 505(b)(2) (2004). Furthermore, a beneficiary who also is a trustee 
will not be treated as having a power of withdrawal over the trust, and thus will not be treated as the 
settlor of the trust for creditors’ rights purposes, if the beneficiary/trustee’s power to distribute to 
him or herself is limited by an ascertainable standard relating to his or her health, education, 
support, or maintenance. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 103(2) and (11) (2004). Arguably, if the 
beneficiary/trustee’s power is not so limited, he or she will be treated as the settlor of a revocable 
trust with respect to the trust assets the beneficiary/trustee could distribute to him or herself. See 
UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 505(b)(1) and 103(11) (2004). However, the comment to the 2004 
amendment to §§ 504(e) and 103(11) states that “[t]he Code does not specifically address the extent 
to which a creditor of a trustee/beneficiary may reach a beneficial interest of a beneficiary/trustee 
that is not limited by an ascertainable standard.” See 2004-2005 Amendments to the Uniform Trust 
Code with Comments § 504 (Tentative Draft 3/1/2005). 
 121. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 155(1) (1959). 
 122. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(b) (2004). Note that § 504(b) applies not only to pure 
discretionary trusts (e.g., “the trustee, at its discretion, may distribute income and principal to the 
beneficiary”), but also to trusts with respect to which the settlor has provided standards for the 
trustee to follow in making distributions to the beneficiary (e.g., “the trustee, at its discretion, may 
distribute income and principal to provide for the beneficiary’s support”). While the common law 
distinguished between so-called “discretionary” and “support” trusts for creditors’ rights purposes, 
the UTC does not. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504 cmt. (2004). 
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former spouse in circumstances in which the trustee’s failure to make a 
distribution constitutes an abuse of its discretion or a failure to comply 
with a standard of distribution.123 
IV.  THE SETTLOR’S ABILITY TO CONTROL INFORMATION THE 
BENEFICIARY RECEIVES FROM THE TRUSTEE 
The UTC imposes both a general obligation on the trustee to keep 
the qualified beneficiaries124 reasonably informed about the 
administration of the trust125 and specific obligations to provide specific 
information to beneficiaries.126 Of more significance are the Code 
provisions prohibiting the settlor from waiving certain of the trustee’s 
reporting obligations.  As originally promulgated, they provided: 
(b) The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of this [Code] 
except:. . . 
 (8) the duty under Section 813(b)(2) and (3) to notify qualified 
beneficiaries of an irrevocable trust who have attained 25 years of age 
of the existence of the trust, of the identity of the trustee, and of their 
 
 123. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 504(c) (2004). While the UTC generally does not allow 
creditors of beneficiaries of discretionary trusts (including those in which standards for distribution 
are included) to compel distributions they can reach, in the absence of spendthrift protection the 
UTC allows the beneficiary’s creditors to reach part or all of distributions the trustee, in the exercise 
of its discretion, decides to make. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 501 (2004). See also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 60 cmts. b, c, reporter’s notes (2003). 
 124. For the definition of “qualified beneficiaries,” see supra note 88. 
 125. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(a) (2004). 
 126. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 813(b), (c) (2004). Note that “beneficiaries” is a defined term in 
the UTC that includes not only those persons who have beneficial interests in the trust, but also 
holders of powers of appointment (in a capacity other than that of a trustee) over trust property. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(2) (2004). Furthermore, “beneficiaries” includes not only those persons 
who received their interests under the terms of the trust but also beneficiaries who 
received their interests by other means, including by assignment, exercise of a power of 
appointment, resulting trust upon the failure of an interest, gap in a disposition, operation 
of an antilapse statute upon the predecease of a named beneficiary, or upon termination 
of the trust. 
Id. cmt. The trustee’s reporting obligations do not apply to beneficiaries of revocable trusts (other 
than the settlor) while the settlor is alive and has capacity. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) & cmt. 
(2000). If the settlor of a revocable trust becomes incapacitated, the trustee must thereafter report to 
the other trust beneficiaries. Id. In 2004, an amendment to § 603(a) bracketed its capacity language. 
2004-2005 Amendments to the Uniform Trust Code with Comments § 603(a) (Tentative Draft 
3/1/2005). In jurisdictions enacting § 603(a) without that language, the duties of a trustee of a 
revocable trust, including the duty to report, will be owed exclusively to the settlor during the 
settlor’s lifetime without regard to the settlor’s capacity. The UTC does not require the trustee to 
“account” to the beneficiary, because of uncertainty with respect to the meaning of the term 
“accounting.” See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1125 n.107. 
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right to request trustee’s reports; 
 (9) the duty under Section 813(a) to respond to the request of a 
beneficiary of an irrevocable trust for trustee’s reports and other 
information reasonably related to the administration of a trust; . . . .127 
These provisions have been among the UTC’s most controversial 
and heavily criticized.128 While a trustee’s duty to inform is 
fundamental,129 the issue of the settlor’s ability to waive that duty 
 
 127. UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(8), (9) (2000). The comment provides: 
Responding to the desire of some settlors that younger beneficiaries not know of the 
trust’s bounty until they have reached an age of maturity and self-sufficiency, subsection 
(b)(8) allows a settlor to provide that the trustee need not even inform beneficiaries 
under age 25 of the existence of the trust. However, pursuant to subsection (b)(9), if the 
younger beneficiary learns of the trust and requests information, the trustee must 
respond. More generally, subsection (b)(9) prohibits a settlor from overriding the right 
provided to a beneficiary in Section 813(a) to request from the trustee of an irrevocable 
trust copies of trustee reports and other information reasonably related to the trust’s 
administration. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 cmt. (2004). For a thorough, critical analysis of the UTC’s provisions 
addressing the trustee’s duty to inform beneficiaries, see Practical Drafting (U.S. Trust Co. of NY) 
7618-32 (April 2004), which was expanded by its authors to include, among other things, a proposal 
for revising § 813 in Heckerling Institute, supra note 38, at 221-23. 
 128. See, e.g., Heckerling Institute, supra note 38, at 221-23; English, Significant Provisions, 
supra note 14, at 202 (stating that, “[t]he most discussed issue during the drafting of the UTC and 
subsequent to its approval is the extent to which a settlor may waive the [disclosure requirements of 
§§ 105(b)(8) and (9)]”); Donald D. Kozusko, In Defense of Quiet Trusts, TR. & EST. 20, 22 (Mar. 1, 
2004) (commenting that, “the UTC has effectively declared the quiet trust violates public policy – 
an official contempt usually reserved for transfers in fraud of a settlor’s creditors, or gifts tied to 
racial or religious overtones” and that “[i]t is inconsistent with a respect for private property to 
prohibit quiet trusts by specifying what trustees must disclose, even if it contradicts a settlor’s best 
judgment.”). 
 129. The rationale for the trustee’s duty to report to beneficiaries is that:  
The beneficiary is the equitable owner of the trust property, in whole or in part. The 
trustee is a mere representative whose function is to attend to the safety of the trust 
property and to obtain its avails for the beneficiary in the manner provided by the trust 
instrument. That the settlor has created a trust and thus required that the beneficiary 
enjoy his property interest indirectly does not imply that the beneficiary is to be kept in 
ignorance of the trust, the nature of the trust property and the details of its 
administration. If the beneficiary is to be able to hold the trustee to proper standards of 
care and honesty and to obtain the benefits to which the trust instrument and doctrines of 
equity entitle him, he must know of what the trust property consists and how it is being 
managed. 
  From these considerations it follows that the trustee has the duty to inform the 
beneficiary of important matters concerning the trust and that the beneficiary is entitled 
to demand of the trustee all information about the trust and its execution for which he 
has any reasonable use. It further follows that the trustee is under a duty to notify the 
beneficiary of the existence of the trust so that he may exercise his rights to secure 
information about trust matters and to compel an accounting from the trustee. 
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 
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received relatively little attention prior to the UTC.130 Of the first ten 
jurisdictions to enact the UTC, however, four (Kansas, Tennessee, Utah, 
and Wyoming) deleted sections 105(b)(8) and (9) entirely.131 A fifth, the 
District of Columbia, allows the settlor to waive the trustee’s obligations 
to report to beneficiaries by designating a surrogate to receive 
information the trustee otherwise would be required to provide to the 
beneficiaries.132 Maine’s version of the UTC modified the requirements 
of sections 105(b)(8) and 105(b)(9) to make the trustee’s duties under 
them applicable only to qualified beneficiaries.133 Missouri limits the 
trustee’s affirmative reporting obligation to current beneficiaries who 
have attained twenty-one years of age.134 
In recognition of the diverse approaches the first ten UTC enacting 
jurisdictions took to this issue, the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended sections 105(b)(8) and 
(9) in 2004 by bracketing them, thus highlighting the option of enacting 
states to modify or delete them.135 Alternatively, the 2004 amendments 
 
961 (rev. 2d ed. 1992) (footnote omitted). Despite the common law duty to inform, the practice of 
some trustees, in some circumstances, apparently has been to not do so. See Kozusko, supra note 
128, at 20. 
 130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. c. (1959) (stating that while the 
settlor may regulate the amount of information the beneficiary receives, and the frequency with 
which it is provided, “the beneficiary is always entitled to such information as is reasonably 
necessary to enable him to enforce his rights under the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of 
trust”); Briggs v. Cowley, 224 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Mass. 1967) (holding that a settlor’s attempt to 
relieve the trustee from the duty to account is against public policy and unenforceable); Wood v. 
Honeyman, 169 P.2d 131 (Or. 1946) (holding that while a settlor may relieve a trustee from the duty 
to inform a beneficiary out of court, the settlor may not relieve the trustee from the duty to account 
in court). The question of the settlor’s ability to waive the trustee’s duty to inform is, of course, 
different than the question of what information a beneficiary should be entitled to receive from the 
trustee in the absence of direction from the settlor to the contrary. With respect to the latter, the 
trend has been toward greater disclosure. See Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 680; Ian Marsh & Michael 
Ben-Jacob, Go Offshore to Avoid Trust Transparency?, TR. & EST. 29, 29 (Mar. 1, 2004) (noting 
the trend towards more transparency with respect to a trustee’s administration of a trust even in 
jurisdictions that have not adopted the UTC and suggesting that settlors for whom confidentiality is 
important create their trusts in offshore jurisdictions that require less disclosure). 
 131. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-105(b) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-15-105 (2004); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-105(b) (2004); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-10-105(b) (Michie 2004). 
 132. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1301.05(b), (c) (2004). This approach of the District has been 
characterized as a “unique and highly unusual” one. 2004 Enactments: District of Columbia, UTC 
NOTES (Summer 2004) at 3, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/newsletters/ 
UTCNotes/UTCnotes_ Jul04_print.pdf. 
 133. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-B, § 105(2)(H), (I) (West 2004). 
 134. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 456.1-105(2)(8) (West 2004). 
 135. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 105(b)(8), (9) (2000), with UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 
105(b)(8), (9) (2004). The comment to the 2004 amendment bracketing §§ 105(b)(8) and (9) 
provides: 
The placing of these provisions in brackets does not mean that the Drafting Committee 
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also insert a bracketed “qualified” in section 105(b)(9), thus noting that 
an enacting jurisdiction might choose to follow Maine’s lead and limit 
the trustee’s mandatory duty to respond to requests for information about 
the trust to qualified beneficiaries, rather than all beneficiaries.136 
If the settlor directs the trustee not to provide any information to the 
beneficiary about the trust, including its existence, the question of 
whether a trust has in fact been created is raised. If a property owner 
transfers property to a transferee to manage on behalf of a third party, 
but the property owner provides that the transferee is not to inform the 
third party of the transfer, the third party presumably will not know of 
his or her interest in the transferred property, and thus will not be able to 
protect it. Such an arrangement arguably constitutes not an enforceable 
trust, but rather an outright gift to the transferee accompanied by 
precatory language with respect to the owner’s desire that the transferee 
use it for the benefit of the third party.137 
For several reasons, however, that should not be the result in 
jurisdictions that enact the UTC without sections 105(b)(8) and (9). 
First, such a jurisdiction’s version of the UTC presumably will include 
the UTC’s provisions on trust creation, which do not include a 
requirement that the beneficiaries know of their trust interests.138 
Second, such a jurisdiction’s version of the UTC presumably will 
include default rules with respect to the trustee’s duty to inform and 
report, similar to those in UTC section 813, along with the authorization 
of the settlor in section 105(a) to override them in the terms of the trust. 
Those provisions would express legislative intent that the settlor may 
create a trust and control what, if any, information the beneficiary is to 
 
recommends that an enacting jurisdiction delete Sections 105(b)(8) and 105(b)(9). The 
Committee continues to believe that Section [sic] 105(b)(8) and (b)(9), enacted as is, 
represent the best balance of competing policy considerations.  Rather, the provisions 
were placed in brackets out of a recognition that there is a lack of consensus on the 
extent to which a settlor ought to be able to waive reporting to beneficiaries, and that 
there was little chance that the states would enact Sections 105(b)(8) and (b)(9) with any 
uniformity. 
2004-2005 Amendments to the Uniform Trust Code with Comments § 105 (Tentative Draft 
3/1/2005). 
 136. Compare UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(9) (2000), with UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(9) 
(2004). 
 137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 172 cmt. d (1959); Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules, supra note 17, at 1126 (“Like a trust term purporting to abrogate all fiduciary duties, or a 
term authorizing the trustee to act in bad faith, a term that prevents the beneficiary from obtaining 
the information needed to enforce the trust entails the risk of making the trust unenforceable and 
hence illusory.”); Marsh & Ben-Jacob, supra note 130, at 30. 
 138. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 (2004). 
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receive about it. Third, for some such trusts, the beneficiary will learn of 
the trust in one way or the other, at one time or another, and thus 
presumably be able to protect his or her interest at that time. For 
example, the settlor may give the trustee discretion with respect to 
furnishing information to the beneficiary,139 and upon making a 
distribution to or for the benefit of the beneficiary, the trustee 
presumably will be required to furnish the beneficiary information for 
the beneficiary’s use in complying with federal and state tax reporting 
requirements.140 Fourth, some such trusts presumably will provide for no 
information to be given to one or more beneficiaries, but for information 
to be provided to one or more other beneficiaries who could enforce the 
trust. 
Note also that the UTC itself creates the possibility of a trust being 
administered for a substantial period of time without any beneficiary 
receiving any information about it because of the limitation on the 
affirmative reporting obligation of section 105(b)(8) to beneficiaries who 
are at least twenty-five years of age.141 Finally, as is explicitly allowed in 
the District of Columbia, in jurisdictions that allow the settlor to waive 
the trustee’s duty to provide any information to the beneficiary about the 
trust, settlors may choose to designate a surrogate to receive information 
about the trust that otherwise would be provided to the beneficiary.142 
Although jurisdictions that allow settlors to bar a beneficiary from 
even knowing about the existence of the trust probably do not jeopardize 
the validity of such trusts, many questions will arise with respect to their 
administration.143 For example, if the settlor directs the trustee not to 
inform the beneficiary about the trust and the beneficiary directly asks 
the trustee if it is trustee of a trust for the beneficiary, how should or can 
 
 139. See Kozusko, supra note 128, at 21. 
 140. Id. at 24 n.4. 
 141. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(8) (2004). 
 142. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1301.05(c)(3) (2004). 
 143. In light of the issues and uncertainties discussed in this paragraph of the text, an important 
objective of the UTC will not be obtainable in jurisdictions that allow the settlor to waive the 
trustee’s duty to provide the beneficiary with information about the trust: to “provide States with 
precise, comprehensive, easily accessible guidance on trust law questions.” UNIF. TRUST CODE, 
prefatory note (2004). Practical problems, as well as legal issues, also may arise when beneficiaries 
are not provided information about trusts of which they are beneficiaries. For example, Professor 
Whitman reports instances of “trust beneficiaries who, when denied disclosure, contacted the 
Internal Revenue Service to report suspected tax evasion and sought redress from their state’s 
attorney general, the Securities Exchange Commission, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the 
Central Intelligence Agency, the police and newspapers.” Robert Whitman, Full Disclosure is Best, 
TR. & EST. 59, 59 (July 2004). Professor Whitman notes that such actions may not be successful, 
but that “the fallout from non-disclosure is costly, both emotionally and financially.” Id. 
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the trustee respond? Section 105(b)(2) makes mandatory the trustee’s 
duty “to act in good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes 
of the trust and the interests of the beneficiaries.”144 If, consistent with 
the directions of the settlor, the trustee denies the existence of the trust, 
or the beneficiary’s status as a beneficiary of the trust, or misrepresents 
the terms of the trust or its assets and their management, arguably the 
trustee would not be acting in good faith with respect to the beneficiary, 
regardless of whether doing so was consistent with the settlor’s intent as 
set forth in the terms of the trust. If the beneficiary believes he or she is a 
beneficiary of a trust, and believes that he or she knows who the trustee 
of the trust is, but the beneficiary is not certain with respect to either 
matter, presumably the beneficiary could successfully pursue a legal 
proceeding to find out.145 If so, could the beneficiary force the trustee to 
account in court? If the settlor directed that no information about the 
trust assets be provided to the beneficiary, would any such accounting be 
accessible by the beneficiary?146 
The District of Columbia approach of allowing the settlor to waive 
the trustee’s duty to inform the beneficiary by designating a surrogate to 
receive information that otherwise is to be provided to the beneficiary 
raises additional questions. To the fundamental question of what are the 
surrogate’s responsibilities to the beneficiary, the District’s version of the 
UTC provides only that the surrogate must “act in good faith to protect 
the interests of beneficiaries.”147 Presumably the surrogate would owe 
fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries, and have potential liabilities, rights, 
and powers with respect to their exercise, but the nature and extent of 
those duties, potential liabilities, rights, and powers are not addressed. 
Could the surrogate ever have an obligation to provide information to 
the beneficiary if the settlor had directed otherwise? For example, if the 
trustee breached a duty, causing serious loss to the trust estate, would the 
beneficiary be entitled to know of the loss and the assertion and 
resolution of any resulting claims by the surrogate against the trustee? If 
 
 144. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (2004). 
 145. If the beneficiary knew of the trust, but knew nothing of the extent of the beneficiary’s 
interest in it, or of the assets in the trust, could the beneficiary sue to obtain that information? If the 
jurisdiction’s trust code allows the settlor to prohibit disclosure to the beneficiary, perhaps the court 
would respect the code and the settlor’s intent and not require disclosure. The beneficiary would 
argue, however, that without that information, the beneficiary would have no way to know if the 
trustee had breached a duty and no way to hold the trustee accountable. 
 146. It has been suggested that if a judicial proceeding involving a trust as to which a 
beneficiary is not to receive information occurs, a guardian ad litem could act for the beneficiary to 
make necessary decisions, and the court record could be sealed. Kozusko, supra note 128, at 24-5. 
 147. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1301.05(c)(3) (2004). 
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the surrogate provided information to the beneficiary against the 
directions of the settlor, would the settlor, or the settlor’s successors, 
have a cause of action against the surrogate for unauthorized disclosure? 
Would the settlor have suffered any damages? 
The District’s surrogate approach to sections 105(b)(8) and (9) does 
not address the effect of the trustee providing information to the 
surrogate on the statute of limitations for actions by the beneficiary 
against the trustee for breach of duty. The one-year statute under the 
UTC runs from the “date the beneficiary or a representative of the 
beneficiary was sent a report. . . .”148 While “representative” is not a 
defined term under the Code,149 it refers to a “person who may represent 
and bind a beneficiary as provided in [the general representation 
provisions of the Code],”150 which may not include a person designated 
by the settlor to receive information on behalf of a beneficiary.151 
Accordingly, under the District’s surrogate approach, the trustee’s 
providing information to a surrogate on behalf of the beneficiary may 
not start the statute of limitations on actions by the beneficiary against 
the trustee. 
V.  THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE TRUST AND ITS TERMS BE FOR THE 
BENEFIT OF THE BENEFICIARIES 
Another of the UTC’s mandatory rules is that “[a] trust and its 
terms be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”152 The stated purpose of 
this principle, which was derived from the Restatement (Third) of 
Trusts,153 is to preclude the settlor from directing in the nondispositive 
provisions of the trust that it be administered to achieve a frivolous, 
capricious, or otherwise invalid trust purpose.154 Rather, the 
nondispositive provisions of a trust are required to reasonably relate to 
 
 148. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1005(a) (2004). 
 149. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 (2004). 
 150. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1005 cmt. (2004). 
 151. D.C. CODE ANN. § 19-1303.01 (2004). 
 152. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (2004) (referring to UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2004)). 
 153. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (2003); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. 
(2004). See also Robert Whitman, Commentary: A Law Professor’s Suggestions for Estate and 
Trust Reform, 12 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 57, 61 (1997) (proposing a Bill of Rights for Trust 
Beneficiaries, the overriding principle of which is that trusts are for the benefit of beneficiaries); 
Scott, Control of Property II, supra note 19, at 650-51 (noting that, “[a] court of equity may 
sometimes authorize the trustees to depart from the testator’s instructions. The trust is created for 
the beneficiaries, and it is their interests which should be considered.”). 
 154. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (2004). 
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the fundamental purpose of benefiting beneficiaries.155 
For example, a trust term requiring trustees’ spouses to be 
Protestants has been held unenforceable.156 Other examples of invalid 
nondispositive provisions from the Restatement are terms directing that 
“money shall be thrown into the sea, that a field shall be sowed with salt, 
that a house shall be boarded up and remain unoccupied, or that a 
wasteful undertaking or activity shall be continued.”157 As noted by the 
Restatement,158 several cases that arguably would have been better 
grounded on the benefit-the-beneficiaries doctrine were instead decided 
based on a strained application of the equitable deviation doctrine,159 
which normally requires a showing of unanticipated circumstances 
because of which compliance with the administrative terms of the trust 
would jeopardize the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.160 
Professor Langbein has predicted that the benefit-the-beneficiaries 
doctrine will be applied most frequently not in cases of capricious 
purposes that eccentric settlors attempt to impose, but rather on value-
impairing investment directions settlors give the trustee.161 By way of 
illustration, he hypothesizes “a modest trust fund for the support of [the 
settlor’s] otherwise destitute widow and orphans” that the settlor directs 
be invested entirely in the stock of a bankrupt corporation because of the 
settlor’s belief that the stock has great appreciation potential.162 While 
such an investment policy for the trust would violate the usual rules of 
diversification and prudent investing,163 those rules are default rules that 
the settlor may override.164 Nevertheless, Professor Langbein concludes 
that no court would enforce such a trust provision,165 because doing so 
“would be so contrary to the risk-and-return profile of the beneficiaries 
 
 155. Id. The comment to § 404 states that its benefit-the-beneficiaries rule implements the 
general purpose of trusts “to benefit [the trust’s] beneficiaries in accordance with their interests as 
defined in the trust’s terms.” Id. 
 156. See, e.g., In re Estate of Coleman, 317 A.2d 631 (Pa. 1974). 
 157. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003). 
 158. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27 cmt. b, reporter’s note (2003). 
 159. See, e.g., In re Pinkerton, 630 N.Y.S.2d 481 (N.Y. Sur. 1995) (rejecting a requirement that 
a trustee be president of a company the trust had sold); In re Estate of Pulitzer, 249 N.Y.S. 87 (N.Y. 
Sur. 1931), aff’d 260 N.Y. S. 975 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932) (allowing the trustee to sell a closely held 
business interest the settlor had directed be retained); Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 135 A. 555 
(Conn. 1926) (refusing to enforce a provision restricting the height of buildings constructed on trust 
land to three stories and limiting leases of trust property to one year). 
 160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167(1) (1959). 
 161. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1111. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT §§ 2, 3 (1994). 
 164. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1(b) (1994). 
 165. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1111. 
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that the direction could not satisfy an objective standard of benefit under 
the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule.”166 More generally, “[t]he requirement 
that there be benefit to the beneficiaries sets outer limits on the settlor’s 
power to abridge the default law [of trusts]. Trust law’s deference to the 
settlor’s direction always presupposes that the direction is beneficiary-
regarding.”167 
This analysis of the benefit-the-beneficiaries doctrine raises at least 
three questions. First, given that no similar restrictions apply to the 
control an owner can exercise over property during life, what is the 
rationale for limiting that control at death? The answer provided by the 
Restatement is that self-interest ordinarily restrains a property owner 
from acting capriciously with respect to his or her own property, and 
society is reluctant to interfere with an owner’s use of his or her own 
property.168 By contrast, public policy requires not enforcing directions 
given by a settlor to another to use property – in which the settlor no 
longer has a beneficial interest – capriciously.169 
Second, how are provisions that are capricious or frivolous to be 
identified? The Restatement notes the obvious: that a clear line between 
capricious and non-capricious purposes cannot be drawn170 and that 
policies affecting that determination will “inevitably vary from time to 
time and place to place.”171 As a general principle, though, 
[a] purpose is not capricious merely because no living person benefits 
directly from its performance, if it satisfies a desire that many (even if 
not most) people have with respect to the disposition of their 
property . . . and the amount of the property to be devoted to the 
purpose is not unreasonably large.172 
 
 166. Id. at 1112. 
 167. Id. 
 168. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003). Professor Scott observed: 
It is bad enough when the power conferred by the possession of property is exercised by 
a living man who is wicked or foolish; it is worse if it is exercised by the wicked or 
foolish dead; the living are at least open to the influence of the world about them; the 
dead are beyond our reach. 
Scott, Control of Property II, supra note 19, at 657. See also Sherman, supra note 30, at 1294. 
 169. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003). But see Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005) (arguing that respecting the right to 
destroy results in social benefits as well as costs of wasted resources, and that a testator who turns 
down an offer to buy a remainder interest in property the testator wants destroyed after his or her 
death should be free to direct its destruction post mortem). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (2003). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. The Restatement’s illustrations include erecting monuments on graves, caring for 
gravesites, offering masses for the souls of the decedent and the decedent’s predeceased spouse, 
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Third, what responsibility, and potential liability, does a trustee 
have when the terms of the trust direct the trustee to administer the trust 
in what is arguably a capricious manner? Professor Langbein’s view is 
that if the trustee determines that following the settlor’s direction to 
retain an interest in a family business would not be in the interests of the 
beneficiaries, it has a duty to resist the direction and risks liability to the 
beneficiaries by not doing so.173 While the Uniform Prudent Investor Act 
explicitly provides that the prudent investor rule (which includes duties 
at the inception of a trusteeship that may include disposing of assets that 
comprise the initial trust corpus174) is a default rule that the settlor may 
override,175 its protection of the trustee from liability for acting in 
reliance on the trust’s terms is limited to actions taken in “reasonable 
reliance” on those terms.176 No guidance on what constitutes “reasonable 
reliance” is provided in the Uniform Prudent Investor Act or its 
comments. Under the Restatement, directions by the settlor that override 
the otherwise applicable prudent investor rule are binding unless they 
violate public policy, are impossible or illegal to perform, or a court has 
directed non-compliance when unanticipated circumstances have arisen 
such that compliance would defeat or substantially impair the 
accomplishment of the purposes of the trust.177 In the event the trustee 
knows, or should have known, of such unanticipated circumstances, 
under the Restatement the trustee is under a duty to apply to the court for 
an order of non-compliance.178 It appears that under the Restatement, the 
trustee will not be liable for following value-impairing investment 
directions of the settlor that not only are inconsistent with the Uniform 
Prudent Investor Act, but also appear to be not in the best interests of the 
beneficiaries, absent such unanticipated circumstances (or a violation of 
public policy, impossibility, or illegality).179 
 
 
developing a phonetic alphabet, and caring for a pet dog. Id. 
 173. See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1116-17. See also Hodgman & 
Blickenstaff, supra note 84, at 289-90. 
 174. See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 4 (1994). 
 175. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 1(b) (1994). 
 176. Id. 
 177. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 228 cmt. e (1992). 
 178. Id. at ill. 6. 
 179. For a trust provision directing the retention of corporate stock “come what may, subject 
only to a duty by the Trustee not to act in bad faith,” suggested in reliance on the protection 
afforded by § 1(b) of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act, see Fast, Gianopulos & Martino, supra note 
59. 
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VI.  THE TRUSTEE’S OBLIGATION TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH; 
EXCULPATION 
Regardless of the breadth of discretion the settlor confers on the 
trustee, the UTC requires the trustee to “act in good faith and in 
accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of 
the beneficiaries.”180 Similarly, a settlor may not exculpate a trustee 
from liability “for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless 
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the 
beneficiaries,”181 or if the exculpation clause “was inserted as the result 
of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or confidential relationship.”182 
Some critics of the UTC have argued that its mandatory 
requirement that the trustee exercise its discretionary powers in good 
faith, even when the settlor grants the trustee broad discretion through 
the use of such terms as “sole and absolute,” is a material change in the 
common law that will have adverse effects on the asset protection 
benefits trusts have traditionally provided.183 However, imposing a good 
faith standard on the trustee’s conduct, regardless of the breadth of 
discretion the settlor has granted the trustee, is not new with the UTC.184 
 
 180. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(2) (2004). While the trustee must act in good faith, the settlor 
may waive the trustee’s otherwise applicable duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries. See UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 105(a) (2004). Allowing the trustee to do so is consistent with common law. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) cmt. t (1959). With respect to the trustee’s exercise of 
discretionary powers, the UTC provides that even if the settlor uses such language as “absolute,” 
sole,” or “uncontrolled” in describing the trustee’s discretion, it must nevertheless be exercised “in 
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of the 
beneficiaries.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a) (2004). Because § 105(b)(2), as originally promulgated, 
did not make mandatory the obligation of the trustee to act “in accordance with the terms . . . of the 
trust” or “the interests of the beneficiaries,” arguably the settlor could waive the trustee’s otherwise 
applicable duty to do so under § 814(a). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(a) (2004). That was not clear, 
however, as § 814(a) is expressly made applicable “[n]otwithstanding the breadth of discretion 
granted to a trustee in the terms of the trust.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a) (2004). To make §§ 
105(b)(2) and 814 (a) consistant, § 105(b)(2) was amended in 2005 to track the language of § 
814(a).  2004-2005 Amendments to the Uniform Trust Code with Comments § 105(b)(2) (Tentative 
Draft 3/1/2005). 
 181. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(a)(1) (2004). 
 182. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1008(a)(2) (2004). If the trustee “drafted or caused to be drafted” 
the exculpatory clause, it is “invalid as an abuse of a fiduciary or confidential relationship unless the 
trustee proves that the exculpatory term is fair under the circumstances. . . to the settlor.” UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 1008(b) (2004). Professor Langbein characterizes the UTC’s exculpatory clause 
provisions as intent-serving. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1123–25. 
 183. See, e.g., Mark Merric and Steven J. Oshins, How Will Asset Protection of Spendthrift 
Trusts Be Affected by the UTC?, 31 EST. PLAN. 478 (Oct. 2004). 
 184. See, e.g., Friedman v. Friedman, 844 So.2d 789 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); In re Estate of 
Mayer, 672 N.Y.S.2d 998 (N.Y. Sur. 1998); Funk v. Comm’r, 185 F.2d 127 (3d Cir. 1951); 
Alexander v. Alexander, 561 S.W.2d 59 (Ark. 1978). 
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While some cases have described the duty of a trustee who has such 
broad discretion in terms of not acting in bad faith, it does not follow 
that a substantive difference between not acting in bad faith, and acting 
in good faith, is intended.185 
Requiring the trustee to act in good faith, regardless of terms of the 
trust to the contrary, arguably is necessary for there to be an enforceable 
trust. If the “trustee” need not act in good faith, the “beneficiary” 
arguably will be unable to hold the “trustee” accountable. In such a case, 
there may be no trust at all. Rather, the holder of property subject to such 
an arrangement arguably is its outright owner, with the language 
describing its use for the “beneficiary” being precatory.186 
VII.  TRUST CREATION 
The UTC makes several changes to the traditional rules governing 
the creation of trusts.187 Generally, these changes relax common-law 
 
 185. For example, a 1991 Colorado Supreme Court case referred to the trustee’s duty not to act 
dishonestly or with an improper motive, or to fail to use his or her judgment. In re Marriage of 
Jones, 812 P.2d 1152, 1156 (Colo. 1991). A year later, however, a lower court in Colorado decided 
a case in which a trustee with sole and absolute discretion over distributions also was a remainder 
beneficiary and thus had a conflict of interest with respect to his exercise of discretion. In re Estate 
of McCart, 847 P.2d 184 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992). In upholding the income beneficiary’s claim for 
increased distributions from the trust, the opinion characterized the trustee’s conduct as an abuse of 
discretion, arbitrary and capricious, improperly motivated, and a “breach of his fiduciary 
responsibilities to act with the utmost good faith and fairness toward the beneficiary.” Id. at 186. 
That some courts use the kind of language employed in Jones and McCart interchangeably is 
illustrated by a California case in which the court stated that if: 
the “sole discretion” vested in and exercised by the trustees in this case. . .were exercised 
fraudulently, in bad faith or in an abuse of discretion, it is subject to. . .review. Whether 
good faith has been exercised, or whether fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion has 
been committed is always subject to consideration by the court upon appropriate 
allegations and proof. 
In re Estate of Ferrall, 258 P.2d 1009, 1013 (Cal. 1953). See also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 
21, at § 187.2 (stating both that a trustee who is granted extended discretion may not act “beyond 
the bounds of a reasonable judgment, if he acts in good faith and does not act capriciously,” and 
that if “by the terms of the trust [the trustee] is not required to act reasonably, the court will interfere 
where he acts dishonestly or in bad faith, or where he acts from an improper motive” ) (footnotes 
omitted; emphasis added); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 129, § 560 (noting that even a trustee 
who is granted absolute or uncontrolled discretion must “employ his discretion deliberately and with 
some thought and not recklessly or capriciously but in a spirit of good faith and honesty”). 
 186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. k (1959); Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules, supra note 17, at 1120, 1124; McNeil v. McNeil, 798 A.2d 503, 509 (Del. 2002); Keating v. 
Keating, 165 N.W. 74 (Iowa 1917). 
 187. Required for the creation of a trust under the UTC are (i) a settlor with capacity to create a 
trust; (ii) an expression of intent by the settlor to do so; (iii) at least one definite beneficiary (unless 
the trust is a charitable trust, or one for the care of a pet, or for another valid noncharitable purpose); 
(iv) duties for the trustee to perform; and (v) a separation of the legal and beneficial interests (i.e., 
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restrictions and are intent-serving.188 Similarly, the UTC’s rules under 
which trusts created in other jurisdictions will be valid189 furthers the 
intent of trust settlors. 
At common law, a “trust” created for the care of a pet was 
unenforceable because it did not have an ascertainable beneficiary who 
could enforce it.190 In many jurisdictions, such a “trust” was not held 
void, however, but instead was characterized as an “honorary trust” that 
the “trustee” could choose, but not be compelled, to respect.191 To the 
extent the trustee did not exercise the power to provide for the pet, he or 
she held the trust assets on a resulting trust for the settlor’s successors.192 
Under the UTC, such trusts are valid and enforceable for the lifetimes of 
the designated pets.193 While such trusts are without ascertainable 
beneficiaries to enforce them (and, not being charitable trusts, are not 
enforceable by the attorney general), the UTC provides for enforcement 
by a person appointed to do so in the terms of the trust, or if none, by the 
 
the same person is not the sole trustee and sole beneficiary). UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a) (2004). 
Under the UTC, the requisite capacity to create (or amend, revoke, or add property to) a revocable 
trust, is the same as the capacity required to make a will. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601 (2004). 
 188. See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 17, at 1121 (noting that the trust creation 
rules inform the settlor of the requirements for creating a valid trust and thus “protect the purported 
transferor (and especially his or her estate) against false or mistaken claims that he or she had 
transferred the property away in trust”). 
 189. An inter vivos trust created in another jurisdiction is valid under the UTC: 
if its creation complies with the law of the jurisdiction in which the trust instrument was 
executed, or the law of the jurisdiction in which, at the time of creation: 
  (1) the settlor was domiciled, had a place of abode, or was a national; 
  (2) a trustee was domiciled or had a place of business; or 
  (3) any trust property was located. 
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 403 (2004). See generally Eugene F. Scoles, Choice of Law in Trusts: 
Uniform Trust Code, Sections 107 and 403, 67 MO. L. REV. 213, 227 (2002) (noting that § 403 
applies even to trusts of real property and is justified, in part, by “the policy of sustaining the 
intended transfer of the owner by reasonable evidence of intent”). 
 190. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 124 (1959). This rule has long been criticized. As 
noted by Professor Scott nearly a century ago, a settlor could accomplish the same or essentially the 
same objective in an enforceable manner through the use of a power of appointment or a conditional 
bequest. Scott, Control of Property I, supra note 1, at 540. Professor Scott argued that: 
There seems to be no reason, therefore, why attempted trusts for these purposes should 
be regarded as against public policy. One is always inclined to doubt the soundness of an 
argument that a disposition is against public policy when the same result accomplished 
in a different way is not against public policy. If they fail it is because of a purely 
technical rule which defeats the intention of the testator. 
Id. For similar arguments made in the context of the UTC’s mandatory notice rules and trust choice 
of law rules, see Kozusko, supra note 128, at 21-28 and Scoles, supra note 189, at 216. 
 191. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47(2) & cmt. d (2003). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408 (2004). 
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court.194 More generally, the UTC also validates trusts without 
ascertainable beneficiaries for other valid noncharitable purposes,195 but 
limits the period during which they may be enforced to 21 years.196 
Again, enforcement may be by a person appointed by the settlor in the 
terms of the trust, or by the court if the settlor does not do so.197 
If a settlor purports to create a testamentary trust for an indefinite 
class of beneficiaries (e.g., “friends”), at common law the trust failed for 
lack of anyone to enforce it, and the assets passed by resulting trust 
through the settlor’s estate to his or her heirs or devisees.198 By contrast, 
if the settlor instead created a trust for those same heirs or devisees, 
subject to a power of appointment in the trustee to direct the disposition 
of the property among the same indefinite class, the power would be 
enforceable. Because those two arrangements are in substance, if not in 
form, identical, the Second Restatement provides that while the first 
does not create an enforceable trust, the “trustee” may select and 
distribute among members of the indefinite class.199 
Consistent with the Third Restatement,200 and in furtherance of the 
objective of giving effect to the settlor’s intent, the UTC goes a step 
further. It provides that the trustee’s power to select among members of 
the indefinite class is valid,201 provided there is at least one person who 
meets the description of the indefinite class.202 If the trustee does not 
exercise the power within a reasonable time, it fails, in which case the 
property subject to the power will pass to those persons who would have 
taken it had the power not been conferred.203 Unlike sections 408 and 
409, each of which address the issue of enforcement when a valid 
 
 194. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 408(b) (2004). Standing to petition the court to appoint or 
remove a person to enforce the trust is conferred on anyone “having an interest in the welfare of the 
animal.” Id. 
 195. See generally Alexander A. Bove Jr., The Purpose of Purpose Trusts, 18 PROB. & PROP. 
34, 34 (Jun. 2004). Although the UTC generally provides that a noncharitable trust without 
ascertainable beneficiaries is enforceable, that is not the case to the extent its purposes are 
capricious. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409 cmt. (2004). Among the purposes for which such trusts can be 
created are the erection of a monument on a grave, the care of a cemetery plot, the saying of masses 
for the repose of the soul of the settlor, and the study of the advantages of a phonetic alphabet. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. d (2003). 
 196. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 409(1) (2004). 
 197. Id. 
 198. See, e.g., Nichols v. Allen, 130 Mass. 211 (Mass. 1879). 
 199. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 122 (1959). 
 200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 46 (2003). 
 201. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(c) (2004). 
 202. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 cmt. (2004). 
 203. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(c) (2004). 
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noncharitable trust for unascertainable beneficiaries is created,204 section 
402(c) does not do so. Presumably, such a trust could be enforced by the 
settlor’s heirs or devisees who would take if the power is not exercised, 
although (as is the case with takers in default of exercise of a power of 
appointment) as a practical matter, their ability to do so would seem to 
be limited by the trustee’s ability to exercise the power to defeat their 
interests. Less clear is whether a member who meets the description of 
the indefinite class could enforce the trust. 
VIII.  PUBLIC POLICY LIMITATIONS ON TRUST PURPOSES 
Another of the UTC’s mandatory rules is that a trust have a purpose 
that is “not contrary to public policy. . . .”205 While the UTC does not 
attempt to define public policy,206 citing the Restatements207 it provides 
in a comment that “[p]urposes violative of public policy include those 
that tend to encourage criminal or tortious conduct, that interfere with 
freedom to marry or encourage divorce, that limit religious freedom, or 
which are frivolous or capricious.”208 
According to the Restatement, the rationale for public policy 
 
 204. See supra notes 190-199 and accompanying text. 
 205. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3) (2004). Under § 404, “[a] trust may be created only to the 
extent its purposes are . . . not contrary to public policy . . . .” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 (2004). 
Section 410 provides that “a trust terminates to the extent . . . the purposes of the trust have 
become . . . contrary to public policy . . . .”  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 410(a) (2004). The comment to § 
103, which includes, among others, the definition of “beneficiary,” states that “[e]xcept as limited 
by public policy, the extent of a beneficiary’s interest is determined solely by the settlor’s intent.”  
UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. (2004). 
 206. A recent analysis of the role of public policy in the law, quoted in the Third Restatement, 
discusses its definition: 
A precise definition of public policy is elusive. It is rooted in the definition of law itself. 
Public policy may be defined broadly to include both utilitarian and moral 
considerations. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., a jurist who was emblematic of the 
American pragmatist tradition, described public policy as the essence of 
jurisprudence . . . . Justice Benjamin Cardozo saw law as an instrument for the conscious 
pursuit for social welfare, an instrument whose master term was policy rather than 
principle. Cardozo explained, more concretely than did Holmes, [that] the final cause of 
law is the welfare of society, defined as public policy, the good of the collective 
body. . . . In practice, . . . hard cases often raise concerns that compel courts to consider 
public policy. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29, reporter’s notes on clause (c) & cmts. i-i(2) (2003) 
(quoting Alan B. Handler, Judging Public Policy, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 301, 303-07 (2000)). 
 207. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts. d-h (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TRUSTS § 62 (1959). 
 208. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (2004). With respect to conditions affecting conjugal and 
religious choices, see Sherman, supra note 30, at 1284 (arguing that such conditions should be 
unenforceable without regard to whether they might pass a reasonableness test). 
NEWMAN1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:57:22 AM 
690 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:649 
limitations on the ability of a settlor to control the enjoyment and use of 
property in trust is that the significant advantages of private trusts  
are properly to be balanced against other social values and the effects 
of deadhand control on the subsequent conduct or personal freedom of 
others, and also against the burdens a former owner’s unrestrained 
dispositions might place on courts to interpret and enforce 
individualized interests and conditions.209 
While imposing public policy limitations on trust dispositions is not 
new,210 conditions in a trust that violate public policy change from time 
to time.211 
 
 209. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i (2003). See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. 
(2004) (“Except as limited by public policy, the extent of a beneficiary’s interest is determined 
solely by the settlor’s intent.”). 
 210. See Scott, Control of Property II, supra note 19, at 632-53. Having reservations about 
interfering with a settlor’s disposition on public policy grounds also is not new: “It seems to me 
extremely dangerous to limit the power of disposition on any general notion of impolity, without 
some definite rule or principle being shown to apply to the case.” Egerton v. Brownlow, 10 Eng. 
Rep. 359, 387-88 (H.L. 1853) (cited in Sherman, supra note 30, at 1280 n.36). In a similar vein, 
public policy as a basis for invalidating provisions in a trust has been referred to as an “unruly 
horse.” Richardson v. Mellish, 130 Eng. Rep. 294, 303 (C.P. 1824). According to Professor Scott, 
while public policy may be an unruly horse, “it is one the judges have to ride. The fact that it is 
difficult to draw the line between dispositions which are merely unwise and those which are 
opposed to public policy does not excuse the courts from attempting to draw the line.” Id. For a 
view that the line should be drawn at the point that “the purpose of the trust is so offensive to our 
mores that society cries out in indignation,” see Jones, supra note 75, at 205. 
 211. “Unfortunately, it is sometimes difficult to determine what is the public policy at any 
given moment, for public policy often changes. The invalid condition of another day may become 
accepted by the time someone challenges it, and vice versa.” WALTER L. NOSSAMAN & JOSEPH L. 
WYATT, JR., TRUST ADMINISTRATION AND TAXATION § 8.01 (Rev. 2d ed. 1990) (cited in 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 gen. notes on clause (c) & cmts. (i)-(ii)). By way of 
example, the Third Restatement departs from the Second Restatement of some forty years earlier in 
at least three material ways on the question of the enforceability of conditions affecting family and 
other personal relationships: it protects relationships between unmarried cohabitants as well as 
spouses, the ability of beneficiaries to divorce, and the ability of beneficiaries to marry outside a 
faith specified by the settlor. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 62 (1959). Even among current Restatements, significant 
differences exist with respect to the enforceability of conditions involving family relationships, 
religious freedom, and careers and conduct. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29, 
reporter’s note to gen. cmt. f (2003) (noting differences between the Restatement (Third) of Trusts 
and the Restatement (Second) of Property: Donative Transfers). Generally, the public policy 
limitation provisions in § 29(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts limit “the extent to which 
settlors may subject the interests of trust beneficiaries to conditions that tend seriously to intrude 
upon significant personal decisions, and the private lives of beneficiaries and their families.” 
Halbach, supra note 31, at 1891. See also Sherman, supra note 30, at 1280 n.39 (noting that while 
the Third Restatement does not expressly state that its treatment of settlor imposed conditions that 
restrain beneficiaries’ conduct is less deferential to the settlor’s wishes, that can be inferred from its 
examples). Note that many limitations on dead hand control do not apply to the living. See supra 
note 168 and accompanying text. 
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In the absence of direction in the UTC for determining what 
conditions violate public policy, the common law will control.212 If a 
trust or a provision in a trust is found to be contrary to public policy, the 
trust may be invalid at inception,213 or, if the violation occurs at a later 
date, at that time.214 Further, the invalidity may apply to particular 
provisions in the trust, rather than to the entire trust.215 In an innovation 
from the common law, in the event of a violation of public policy, the 
Restatement allows a trust to be reformed, if public policy concerns and 
legitimate settlor objectives can be accommodated.216 While the UTC 
relaxes, to some extent, the restrictive rules on modifying trusts,217 none 
of its modification provisions expressly accommodate a reformation of 
the kind allowed by the Third Restatement when a trust is determined to 
be contrary to public policy. Depending on the circumstances, including 
the nature of the public policy violation, however, such a determination 
arguably could constitute an unanticipated circumstance that would 
allow modification of the trust under section 412(a).218 
A different public policy limitation on the UTC’s honoring of the 
settlor’s intent applies under section 107 with respect to the settlor’s 
choice of governing law for a trust:219 
The meaning and effect of the terms of a trust are determined by: (1) 
the law of the jurisdiction designated in the terms unless the 
designation of that jurisdiction’s law is contrary to a strong public 
policy of the jurisdiction having the most significant relationship to the 
matter at issue. . . .220 
While section 107 generally allows the settlor to select the jurisdiction 
whose law will govern the trust without the trust having any other 
connection to the jurisdiction,221 the “strong public policy” limitation 
introduces uncertainty with respect to when a settlor’s choice of law will 
 
 212. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 (2004). 
 213. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (2004). 
 214. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 410(a) (2004). 
 215. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404 cmt. (2004). 
 216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(1) & reporter’s note (2003). 
 217. See supra notes 19-108 and accompanying text. 
 218. Reformation might also be allowed under common law. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 106 (2004). 
While there may be little or no support in the case law for such an approach, the comment to §106 
refers to the Restatements as a source of common law that supplements the UTC. Id. cmt. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. i(1), reporter’s note (2003). 
 219. See generally Scoles, supra note 189, at 217-219. 
 220. UNIF. TRUST CODE §107(1) (2004). 
 221. UNIF. TRUST CODE §107 cmt. (2004). 
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be respected.222 The UTC “does not attempt to specify the strong public 
policies sufficient to invalidate a settlor’s choice of governing law. 
These public policies will vary depending upon the locale and may 
change over time.”223 
IX.  TRUSTEE COMPENSATION 
The UTC does not allow a settlor to specify, with finality, the 
trustee’s compensation. Rather, if the compensation set by the settlor is 
unreasonably low or high, or if the trustee’s duties are substantially 
different from those contemplated upon creation of the trust, the court 
may exercise its inherent equity power to adjust the trustee’s 
compensation,224 regardless of language in the instrument to the 
contrary.225 
While the UTC’s trustee compensation provisions have received 
little attention, they depart from the Restatement’s rules on the subject 
under which it is more difficult for the trustee or the beneficiaries to 
successfully seek to change the compensation the settlor intended the 
trustee to receive.226  Under the Restatement’s rule, the trustee’s ability 
to receive more compensation than specified by the settlor is not 
dependent on a determination that it is unreasonably low or that there 
has been a material change in the trustee’s duties.227 Rather, it requires a 
showing that the “amount of compensation provided by the terms of the 
trust is so inadequate that no qualified person would be willing to act as 
trustee for the compensation so provided.”228 Similarly, if a beneficiary 
claims that the compensation set by the settlor is too high, the 
Restatement does not look to whether the specified compensation is 
unreasonably high or there has been a material reduction in the trustee’s 
 
 222. For a discussion of issues raised by § 107, including the questions of what distinguishes a 
“strong” public policy from other public policies, and whether all of the fourteen mandatory rules of 
§105(b) reflect strong public policies, see Heckerling Institute, supra note 38, at 172-74. See also 
Scoles, supra note 189, at 234. 
 223. UNIF. TRUST CODE §107 cmt. (2004). For a discussion of whether a settlor in a state in 
which self-settled spendthrift trusts are not valid could designate the law of another state in which 
such trusts are valid and thus preclude the settlor’s creditors from reaching the trust assets, see 
Scoles, supra note 189, at 235-36. 
 224. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §708(b) (2004). 
 225. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §105(b)(7) (2004). 
 226. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 (1959), with UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
708(b) (2004). 
 227. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 (1959). 
 228. Id. cmt. f. 
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duties.229 Rather, the compensation set by the settlor will be reduced if 
the provision setting it was included in the instrument as a result of “an 
abuse of fiduciary or confidential relationship existing between the 
trustee and settlor at the time of the creation of the trust.”230 
X.  THE COURT’S AUTHORITY TO ACT AS NECESSARY IN THE INTERESTS 
OF JUSTICE (AND TO REQUIRE, DISPENSE WITH, OR MODIFY OR 
TERMINATE A BOND) 
Also beyond the settlor’s control is “the power of the court to take 
such action and exercise such jurisdiction as may be necessary in the 
interests of justice.”231 The only mention of this mandatory rule in the 
comments is a restatement of the rule itself, accompanied by a statement 
that it includes the ability of the court to require the trustee to furnish a 
bond.232 Because the power of the court to require a bond is itself the 
subject of a separate mandatory rule,233 the reference to it in the 
comment is not helpful in determining the circumstances under which 
the broad power of the court to act as necessary in the interests of justice 
may be exercised. 
Professor English has noted two circumstances in which the court’s 
inherent equity power over trusts could be exercised. First, the court 
could override a provision in the instrument prohibiting a conservator or 
guardian from exercising the power of an incapacitated settlor to revoke 
a revocable trust.234 Second, the court could remove a trustee without 
regard to provisions of the instrument that regulate trustee removal.235 
As each of these subjects is addressed by separate provisions of the UTC 
that the settlor otherwise may override,236 it appears that the default 
nature of the UTC’s provisions, other than those listed in section 105(b), 
is subject to the court’s ability to override the settlor’s intent when it 
determines that doing so is “necessary in the interests of justice.”237 
Courts have exercised their inherent equity power under non-UTC 
law in a variety of ways related to the administration of trusts.238 Further, 
 
 229. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 242 (1959). 
 230. Id. cmt. f. 
 231. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(13) (2004). 
 232. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103 cmt. (2004). 
 233. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(6) (2004). 
 234. English, Significant Provisions, supra note 14, at 191 n.13. 
 235. Id. at 198 n.225. 
 236. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 602(f), 706(b), 105 (2004). 
 237. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(13) (2004). 
 238. See, e.g., Shaull v. U.S., 161 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (requiring the trustee to furnish a 
bond); Todd v. Citizens’ Gas Co., 46 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1931) (enforcing charitable trust); State ex 
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at least two courts have, directly or indirectly, exercised their inherent 
jurisdiction over trusts to modify dispositive provisions of trusts by 
increasing distributions to a trust’s primary beneficiary when the 
distributions provided for by the settlor proved inadequate for the 
beneficiary’s support.239 Because section 105(b)(13) does not limit the 
court’s inherent equity power to administrative matters, it appears that it 
also may be exercisable with respect to the dispositive terms of a trust. 
XI.  TRUSTEE REMOVAL 
The UTC’s trustee removal rules set forth in section 706 are not 
mandatory under section 105(b),240 and thus generally may be 
overridden by the settlor. Therefore, at the most basic level, the UTC 
respects the settlor’s intent with respect to whether and under what 
conditions, if any, the trustee may be changed.241 But to the extent the 
settlor does not address trustee removal in the terms of the trust, the 
UTC’s default rules of section 706 will govern. As discussed below, in 
expanding the common-law rules on trustee removal, the UTC’s default 
rules increase the ability of beneficiaries to change trustees. Whether 
those rules are consistent with what most trust settlors who do not 
 
rel. Goddard v. Coerver, 412 P.2d 259 (Ariz. 1966) (ordering sale of trust assets); In re Estate of 
Nicholson, 93 P.2d 880 (Colo. 1939) (approving a compromise agreement among beneficiaries and 
trustees); Dyer v. Paddock, 70 N.E.2d 49 (Ill. 1946) (directing a deviation where unforeseen 
contingencies arise and there is danger of loss to the beneficiaries); E. Me. Gen. Hosp. v. Harrison, 
193 A. 246 (Me. 1937) (appointing a successor trustee); Weston v. Fuller, 9 N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 
1937) (correcting errors in previously settled accounts); Williams v. Duncan, 55 S.W.3d 896 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2001) (making all orders necessary for the preservation and conservation of trust estates, 
including removal of the trustee); Morris Cmty. Chest v. Wilentz, 3 A.2d 808 (N.J. Ch. 1939) 
(authorizing investments outside statutory list); In re Estate of Mayne, 345 P.2d 790 (Wyo. 1959) 
(punishing a trustee for contempt of court); State v. Underwood, 86 P.2d 707 (Wyo. 1939) 
(permitting trustee to mortgage trust property). 
 239. See Longwith v. Riggs, 14 N.E. 840 (Ill. 1887); In re Wolcott, 56 A.2d 641 (N.H. 1948). 
However, courts in other cases in which such a modification has been requested have refused to 
grant it. See, e.g., In re Estate of Van Deusen, 182 P.2d 565, 571-73 (Cal. 1947); Staley v. Ligon, 
210 A.2d 384, 388 (Md. 1965). As discussed supra, notes 69-75 and accompanying text, the UTC 
allows such modifications when, because of unanticipated circumstances, they will further the 
purposes of the trust.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a) (2004).  
 240. The UTC’s rules allowing the court to modify or terminate a trust are mandatory. UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4) (2004). Unlike § 65 of the Third Restatement, however, the UTC does not 
treat removal of the trustee as a modification of the trust. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411 cmt. (2004). 
Rather, under the UTC removal of the trustee is treated exclusively by § 706, the rules of which are 
not mandatory under § 105(b). Id. See also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). 
 241. As discussed in the preceding section of this Article, however, the UTC’s mandatory rule 
of § 105(b)(13) acknowledges the court’s inherent equity power over trusts, which may include the 
ability to change trustees without regard to the terms of the trust. See supra notes 231-239 and 
accompanying text. If that is the case, it may explain, in part, why no part of § 706 is mandatory. 
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address the issue in their instruments would intend is difficult to 
gauge.242 
Generally, absent a provision in the instrument to the contrary, at 
common law beneficiaries may not remove the trustee except for 
cause.243 The rationale for limiting the ability of the beneficial owners of 
the trust property to control who manages it for them is deference to the 
intent of the settlor: “Because of the discretion normally granted to a 
trustee, the settlor’s confidence in the judgment of the particular person 
whom the settlor selected to act as trustee is entitled to considerable 
weight.”244 This basis for prohibiting beneficiaries from removing the 
trustee, except for cause, has been the subject of considerable criticism 
when the trustee is a professional, corporate trustee.245 Because today’s 
banking environment is characterized by increasingly large banks, 
mergers and other consolidations, and transfers of trust business, critics 
of the common-law rules assert that “it is not material to the purpose of 
the trust for a particular corporate trustee to serve as trustee when 
another corporate trustee could perform the same function.”246 The 
 
 242. Noting anecdotal evidence of settlors opting out of the traditional trustee removal rules in 
favor of making it easier for trustees to be removed, including an increased use of trust protectors 
who are authorized to change trustees, Professor Sitkoff argues that the trustee removal default rules 
should relax the traditional, restrictive common law rules. See Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 665. 
Additionally, Professor Chester and Ms. Ziomek argue that giving beneficiaries a greater ability to 
change trustees will lead to more effective trust administration, which the settlor likely would have 
intended.  Chester & Ziomek, supra note 8, at 264.  They also argue that, in any event, the settlor’s 
intent with respect to who serves as trustee should be respected only during the settlor’s lifetime. Id. 
at 254, 261. An argument for retaining limitations on the ability of beneficiaries to change trustees 
is that a trustee who may easily be removed by the beneficiaries may not exercise its discretion with 
respect to such matters as distributions and investments as independently as the settlor intended. For 
a tax case rejecting the idea that trustees will not properly fulfill their fiduciary duties if they can be 
removed by the beneficiaries, see Estate of Wall v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 300 (1993). 
 243. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 129, § 527. It is more difficult to remove a trustee 
appointed by the settlor than one appointed by the court, particularly if the settlor knew of the 
asserted ground for removal when the settlor designated the trustee. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 37 cmt. f (2003). 
 244. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). See also In re Trust Estate of Powell, 411 P.2d 162 
(Wash. 1966).  Traditionally, the intent of the settlor is primary and the desires of the beneficiaries, 
whose interests derive solely from the gift of the settlor, are secondary. See, e.g., In re Ulansey 
Estate, 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 453 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1975). 
 245. See, e.g., Chester & Ziomek, supra note 8; Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 22, at 1338. 
 246. Chester & Ziomek, supra note 8, at 257-58. For a case agreeing with this argument, see 
Letter Opinion from Glen A. Severson, Circuit Court Judge, Circuit Court of South Dakota, Second 
Judicial Circuit, to counsel regarding In re May C. Hogan Trust, Trust No. 84-17 (Nov. 10, 1999), 
on file with the Circuit Court of South Dakota, Second Judicial Circuit (cited and discussed by 
Chester & Ziomek, supra note 8, at 256-58). While Professor Chester and Ms. Ziomek also argue 
that there should be a presumption that the beneficiaries may change institutional trustees, id. at 
274, they do not go so far as to argue the beneficiaries should be able to remove a trustee at will. Id. 
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traditional, restrictive common law rules on trustee removal have also 
been under attack by beneficiary organizations whose overriding 
principle is that trusts are for the benefit of their beneficiaries.247 
Perhaps in response to such factors,248 the UTC’s default rules have 
significantly expanded the grounds for changing trustees.249 First and 
most important, if the qualified beneficiaries250 unanimously request that 
the trustee be removed, section 706(b)(4) authorizes the court to do so if 
it “finds that removal of the trustee best serves the interests of all of the 
beneficiaries and is not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, 
and a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.”251 When the 
settlor selects an individual trustee, presumably the choice of trustee 
usually will be material to the settlor’s purposes for the trust.252 When a 
corporate trustee is serving, however, beneficiaries presumably will 
more often be able to show that removal of the corporate trustee would 
not be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, particularly if it 
is the successor through court appointment, merger or other 
consolidation of another corporate trustee designated by the settlor. 
Second, section 706(b)(4) also authorizes the court to remove a 
trustee if there has been a substantial change of circumstances (and the 
court finds that removal best serves the interests of the beneficiaries, is 
not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and that a suitable 
replacement is available).253 Changed circumstances that might warrant 
removal of the trustee include “a substantial change in the character of 
 
at 256-58. Rather, in their view a court applied “best interests of the beneficiaries” test should 
govern to strike a balance “between easy portability of a given corporate trusteeship and the 
interests of the settlor/promisee and trustee/promisor in establishing the trust deal.” Id. at 275. Also 
supporting the argument that beneficiaries should have a greater ability to change the trustee is the 
fact that they are the “residual claimants” of the trustee’s management of the trust assets who bear 
the marginal costs and receive the benefits of the trustee’s administration of the trust. Sitkoff, supra 
note 6, at 663. 
 247. See, e.g., Whitman, supra note 143, at 62. 
 248. See Chester & Ziomek, supra note 8, at 253. 
 249. The basic, traditional ground of removing a trustee when it has committed a serious 
breach of trust is preserved. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(1) (2004). With respect to what constitutes 
a “serious” breach, the comment notes that it could be a single act or multiple smaller breaches that, 
when considered together, justify removal. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). 
 250. Generally, “qualified beneficiaries” are current and first line remainder beneficiaries. See 
supra note 88. 
 251. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4) (2004). Note that removal may be allowed under § 
706(b)(4) without regard to whether there has been a breach or poor performance by the trustee. Id. 
 252. Settlors presumably name individuals as trustees based on their relationships with the 
named individuals, their confidence in the named individuals’ abilities and judgment, and the named 
individuals’ knowledge of the settlors’ intentions and values and the beneficiaries’ circumstances. 
 253. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(4) (2004). 
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the service or location of the trustee.”254 
A third expansion by the UTC of the default rules for changing 
trustees is its authorization of the court to remove a trustee if “because of 
unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent failure of the trustee to administer 
the trust effectively, the court determines that removal of the trustee best 
serves the interests of the beneficiaries.”255 The comment fleshes out 
these three grounds for removal: (i) unfitness is not limited to incapacity, 
but also includes a lack of the basic abilities necessary to administer a 
trust;256 (ii) unwillingness is not limited to situations in which the trustee 
literally refuses to act, but also includes cases in which the trustee 
demonstrates a pattern of indifference to some or all of the 
beneficiaries;257 and (iii) “[a] ‘persistent failure to administer the trust 
effectively’ might include a long-term pattern of mediocre performance, 
such as consistently poor investment results when compared to 
comparable trusts.”258 
A fourth ground under the UTC for removing a trustee is lack of 
cooperation among cotrustees that “substantially impairs the 
administration of the trust.”259 The lack of cooperation need not rise to 
the level of a breach of trust.260 Rather, removal may be justified if the 
trustees’ inability to agree results in the need for a judicial proceeding to 
resolve the impasse.261 In such a case, the court may remove any or all of 
the co-trustees.262 
Finally, in another departure from common-law rules,263 even if the 
 
 254. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). However, “[a] corporate reorganization of an 
institutional trustee is not itself a change of circumstances if it does not affect the service provided 
the individual trust account.” Id. 
 255. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(3) (2004). “Interests of the beneficiaries” means their 
interests as defined in the terms of the trust, not as the beneficiaries, or the court, determine them to 
be. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 103(8) (2004). 
 256. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). In determining whether a trustee lacks the requisite 
competencies to administer a trust, “the court should consider the extent to which the problem might 
be cured by a delegation of functions the trustee is personally incapable of performing.” Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. 
 259. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706(b)(2) (2004). 
 260. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. Note that the lack of cooperation ground for trustee removal under § 706(b)(2) applies 
to co-trustees, not to the relationship between the trustee(s) and the beneficiaries. Id. With respect to 
the latter, “[f]riction between the trustee and the beneficiaries is ordinarily not a basis for removal. 
However, removal might be justified if a communications breakdown is caused by the trustee or 
appears to be incurable.” Id. 
 263. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 cmt. (2004). 
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settlor has not reserved the power to remove the trustee,264 the UTC 
allows the settlor, as well as a beneficiary or co-trustee, to petition the 
court for removal of the trustee of an irrevocable trust.265 While the 
grounds for removal are the same whether the settlor or the beneficiary 
is the petitioner, this UTC provision clearly is protective of the settlor’s 
intentions with respect to the ongoing administration of the trust.266 
XII.  DELEGATION 
Under the Second Restatement, a trustee could not delegate, to 
either another trustee or to an agent, duties the settlor reasonably 
expected the trustee to perform.267 While the UTC essentially retains the 
traditional rule with respect to delegations among co-trustees,268 it 
follows the lead of the Uniform Prudent Investor Act in allowing 
delegations to agents of “duties and powers that a prudent trustee of 
comparable skills could properly delegate under the circumstances.”269 
The two standards are different “because the two situations are 
different.”270 The broader standard for delegations to an agent is based 
on the recognition that many trustees do not have the skills of a 
professional trustee, in which case delegations of the functions they are 
not competent to perform should be encouraged.271 By contrast, the 
 
 264. Such a power, if accompanied by the ability to appoint the settlor or someone who is 
related or subordinate to the settlor as successor trustee, could cause adverse estate tax 
consequences. See Rev. Rul. 95-58, 1995-2 C.B. 191 (1995). 
 265. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 706 (2004). With respect to a revocable trust, while the settlor 
has capacity, only the settlor, and not the beneficiaries, may remove the trustee. Id. cmt. 
 266. While the UTC allows the settlor to petition for removal of a trustee, it does not provide 
the settlor with a role in filling a vacancy in a trusteeship. Rather, if a vacancy occurs and the 
instrument does not designate a successor, the qualified beneficiaries, acting unanimously, may 
appoint one, and if they do not do so, the court will fill the vacancy. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 704(c) 
(2004). 
 267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959). The traditional distinction 
between delegable and non-delegable duties sometimes is inaccurately stated as whether the duty is 
ministerial (delegable) or discretionary (non-delegable). See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 129, § 
555. 
 268. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703(e) (2004). 
 269. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 807(a) (2004). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: 
PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992). The rule allowing trustees to delegate the investment 
function is discussed in John H. Langbein, Reversing the Nondelegation Rule of Trust-Investment 
Law, 59 MO. L. REV. 105 (1994). 
 270. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 cmt. (2004). 
 271. Id. With respect to the investment function, the rule of the Second Restatement was that 
“[a] trustee cannot properly delegate to another power to select investments.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 cmt. h (1959). Under the Third Restatement, trustees not only have the 
power to delegate with respect to investments, they may have a duty to do so. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992). 
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stricter rule with respect to delegations among co-trustees – prohibiting 
delegations of functions the settlor reasonably expected the trustees to 
perform jointly – “is premised on the assumption that the settlor selected 
co-trustees for a specific reason.”272 The UTC’s rules with respect to 
both kinds of delegations are default rules that a settlor whose intent is 
otherwise may override in the terms of the trust.273 
XIII.  REVOCABLE TRUSTS 
Article 6 of the UTC addresses a variety of revocable trust issues. 
Generally, these provisions are not mandatory ones and thus may be 
overridden by the settlor.274 With respect to the creation of revocable 
trusts, in requiring only the capacity necessary to make a will, rather 
than the greater capacity necessary to make an inter vivos transfer, the 
UTC furthers the intent of settlors who are increasingly using revocable 
trusts as will substitutes.275 Under section 603(a), the rights of the 
beneficiaries of a revocable trust are subject to the control of the settlor, 
and the duties of the trustee (including the duty to report to and inform 
the beneficiaries) are owed exclusively to the settlor.276 As originally 
 
 272. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 703 cmt. (2004). 
 273. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105 (2004). 
 274. Id. The exception is § 601, under which the capacity required to create, amend, revoke, or 
add property to a revocable trust is the same as to make a will. Because one of the mandatory rules 
prevents the settlor from overriding the UTC’s rules for creating a trust, the capacity requirement 
under § 601 for creating a revocable trust (and perhaps for amending or adding property to one, 
since those actions are analogous to creating such a trust) cannot be overridden. Apparently the § 
105(b)(1) prohibition would not apply to an attempt to change the capacity requirement for revoking 
a revocable trust. 
 275. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 601 & cmt. (2004). 
 276. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2004). Note, however, the inconsistency between the 
statement in § 603(a) that the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to the settlor while the 
settlor has capacity, and the statement in the comment to § 603 prior to its amendment in 2005 that 
“[t]his section has the effect of postponing enforcement of the rights of the beneficiaries of a 
revocable trust until the death or incapacity of the settlor or other person holding the power to 
revoke the trust.” Id. cmt. (emphasis added). If the trustee’s duties are owed exclusively to the 
settlor while he or she has capacity, arguably other beneficiaries would have no claim against a 
trustee who breached a duty while the settlor had capacity, even if the settlor died or became 
incapacitated without ever learning of the breach. Rather, a claim for the breach arguably would 
have to be asserted by the settlor’s conservator or guardian (or by the personal representative of the 
settlor’s estate, if the settlor had died) and any recovery apparently would belong to the settlor (or 
the settlor’s estate), perhaps for ultimate distribution to different beneficiaries than the other trust 
beneficiaries. Consistent with the language from the comment quoted above, the preferable 
alternative would be to allow the other trust beneficiaries, or a successor trustee acting on their 
behalf, to pursue such a breach after the settlor’s death or incapacity (assuming the settlor had not 
consented to or ratified the conduct that constituted the breach), and for any resulting recovery to 
belong to the trust.  In 2005, the comment to § 603 was amended to address these issues.  Under it, 
NEWMAN1.DOC 5/2/2005  8:57:22 AM 
700 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:649 
promulgated, section 603(a) provided that if the settlor becomes 
incapacitated, the trustee’s duties are thereafter owed to the 
beneficiaries.277 In response to concerns expressed over the incapacity 
provision of section 603(a), it was amended in 2004 to bracket the 
reference to the settlor’s incapacity to highlight that enacting states may 
want to limit the reporting and other obligations of the trustee of a 
revocable trust to the settlor, during his or her lifetime, even if he or she 
becomes incapacitated.278 
Because trust instruments that do not address whether they are 
revocable or irrevocable often are drafted by non-professionals and 
intended as will substitutes,279 the UTC includes an intent-serving 
provision that rejects the common law presumption that trusts are 
irrevocable unless expressly made revocable.280 The UTC goes further 
than reversing the presumption; under it, a settlor may revoke or amend 
a trust unless its terms expressly provide otherwise.281 Another UTC 
revocable trust provision that usually will be intent serving allows the 
settlor to revoke a revocable trust by any means that demonstrates clear 
and convincing evidence of that intent, unless the instrument not only 
provides a means of revocation, but also expressly makes it exclusive.282 
If a settlor of a revocable trust appoints an agent under a durable power 
of attorney, the UTC prohibits the agent from exercising the settlor’s 
powers with respect to revocation, amendment, or distribution of trust 
property unless expressly authorized by the settlor in the durable power 
 
recovery for a breach of trust after the settlor’s incapacity or death (assuming lack of consent to the 
breach) would be for the trust, not for the settlor or the settlor’s estate.  2004-2005 Amendments to 
the Uniform Trust Code with Comments  § 603 cmt. (Tentative Draft 3/1/2005). 
UTC § 603(a) may be particularly problematic in the context of a beneficiary who serves as 
trustee of a third-party created trust and whose power to distribute to himself or herself is not 
limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, maintenance, or support. Such a 
beneficiary/trustee arguably is treated as the settlor of a revocable trust with respect to amounts 
distributable to him or herself.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(b). See also supra note 120. If so, a 
beneficiary/trustee with the power to distribute, for example, for his or her “comfort and welfare” 
(arguably not the requisite ascertainable standard; see Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-1(b)(2) (2005)) 
apparently would not be accountable to other beneficiaries of the trust while he or she served as 
trustee. 
 277. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2000). 
 278. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2004).  
 279. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 cmt. (2004). 
 280. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(a) (2004). 
 281. Id. 
 282. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c)(2) (2004). Permitted are revocations or amendments 
made by “a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or specifically devises property that 
would otherwise have passed according to the terms of the trust.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 
602(c)(2)(A) (2004). Further, if the terms of the trust specify a means of revocation that is 
exclusive, substantial compliance with it will be sufficient. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c)(1) (2004). 
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or the terms of the trust.283 The rationale for this limitation on the agent’s 
authority with respect to the trust is that “most settlors usually intend . . . 
the revocable trust, and not the power of attorney, to function as the 
settlor’s principal property management device.”284 
XIV.  ABILITY OF THE BENEFICIARIES AND TRUSTEE TO CIRCUMVENT 
THE SETTLOR’S INTENT 
Consistent with the Second Restatement,285 section 1009 provides 
that if a beneficiary consents to conduct by the trustee that would or 
did286 constitute a breach of trust, ratifies it, or releases the trustee from 
liability with respect to it, the trustee will not be liable to that beneficiary 
for the breach.287 There is no exception in section 1009 for conduct that 
violates a material purpose of the trust. Rather, the only exceptions to the 
trustee’s avoidance of liability under the section are if the beneficiary’s 
consent, release, or ratification was induced by improper conduct of the 
trustee, or if at the time of the consent, release, or ratification, the 
beneficiary did not know of his or her rights or of the material facts 
relating to the breach.288 
Although section 1009 cuts off trustee liability only with respect to 
beneficiaries who provide a consent, release, or ratification to the 
trustee’s conduct, if all beneficiaries do so (and neither of the exceptions 
described in the preceding paragraph apply), the trustee could administer 
the trust in accordance with the beneficiaries’ desires, rather than the 
settlor’s material purposes, without risk of liability.289 While many trusts 
 
 283. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(c) (2004). 
 284. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602 cmt. (2004). Similarly, neither a conservator nor a guardian 
of a settlor may exercise the settlor’s powers with respect to a revocable trust without court 
approval. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 602(f) (2004). 
 285. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 216-218 (1959). 
 286. The beneficiary’s consent, release, or ratification may occur before or after the trustee’s 
conduct.  See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1009 cmt. (2004). 
 287. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1009 (2004). Consents under § 1009 may be important for the 
trustee because of uncertainties about the preclusive effect of a trustee’s report under the one year 
limitations period of § 1005(a). See Practical Drafting (U.S. Trust Co. of NY) 7632-36 (April 
2004). 
 288. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1009 (2004). The Third Restatement includes another limitation 
on the effectiveness of beneficiaries’ consents to shield the trustee from liability for a breach. Under 
it, the trustee may not be protected from liability, even to a consenting beneficiary, if the trustee’s 
action was contrary to a material purpose of the trust and not taken reasonably and in good faith. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003). 
 289. The ability of the trustee and beneficiaries to circumvent the settlor’s intent in this way is 
not new with the UTC. See CHESTER, supra note 28, at 144. While the settlor of a charitable trust 
has standing to enforce it under § 405(c), the settlor of a noncharitable trust is given no similar right. 
See supra note 97. See also Sitkoff, supra note 6, at 669 (noting that if the settlor could enforce the 
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will have minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries, getting the 
consent, release, or ratification of all beneficiaries may be possible using 
the representation provisions of UTC Article 3.290 
In contrast with section 1009, section 111 permits “interested 
persons,” who presumably may include all beneficiaries and the 
trustee,291 to enter into a binding nonjudicial settlement agreement with 
respect to trust matters.292 For such an agreement to be valid, it must not 
violate a material purpose of the trust.293 In many cases, however, the 
material purpose limitation will be more illusory than real. If trust 
beneficiaries and the trustee wish to enter into a binding nonjudicial 
settlement agreement, but would be foreclosed from doing so under 
section 111 by its material purpose limitation, they could effectively do 
so by entering into an agreement with respect to which the trustee would 
be protected under section 1009.294 Note, however, that section 1009 is 
not a mandatory rule.295 Accordingly, a settlor who is concerned about 
the possibility of the trustee and beneficiaries agreeing to terminate the 
trust early, or otherwise to administer it in a way that would violate a 
material purpose of the settlor for the trust, could provide in the terms of 
the trust that a consent, release, or ratification by a beneficiary will not 
protect the trustee from liability for a material breach. 
 
trust, the trustee “would be less likely to enter into a side bargain with the beneficiaries to avoid the 
ex ante constraints imposed by the settlor.”). 
 290. Article 3 of the UTC includes provisions for the representation of beneficiaries not only 
by such fiduciaries as personal representatives, trustees, guardians, and conservators, but also by a 
parent of a minor beneficiary, the holder of a general testamentary power of appointment, and by 
another person having a substantially identical issue with respect to the issue as to which the 
representation applies. See UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 301-304 (2004). A limitation on the ability of a 
person to represent a beneficiary under the UTC’s representation provisions is that the 
representative must not have a conflict of interest with respect to the representation. Id. Thus, if the 
trustee’s conduct that otherwise would constitute an actionable breach arguably would benefit 
consenting beneficiaries at the potential expense of beneficiaries for whom representation would be 
required, the consenting beneficiaries would be unable to also consent on behalf of those other 
beneficiaries. In such a case, § 305 authorizes the court to appoint a representative of the minor, 
unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries with respect to whom the conflict exists. 
 291. The UTC does not define the “interested persons” whose consent is required to have a 
binding nonjudicial settlement agreement “[b]ecause of the great variety of matters to which a 
nonjudicial settlement may be applied.” See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111 cmt. (2004). If the agreement 
involves a trustee’s administration of the trust, the trustee’s consent ordinarily would be required. 
Id. 
 292. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111(b) (2004). 
 293. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 111(c) (2004). 
 294. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 1009 (2004). 
 295. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b) (2004). 
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XV.  CONCLUSION 
In the context of the wave of recent legislation that effectively 
abolishes the Rule Against Perpetuities and the increasing use of 
perpetual and other long-term trusts,296 the Uniform Trust Code has 
taken a number of steps towards accommodating the interests of trust 
beneficiaries when those interests will not be served by strict adherence 
to the settlor’s intent as set forth in the terms of the trust. Mandatory 
rules that the settlor may not override include, among others, the rules by 
which a court may modify or terminate a trust.297 The material purpose 
limitation on the ability of beneficiaries to terminate a trust has been 
relaxed.298 Dispositive as well as administrative terms of a trust may be 
modified under the unanticipated-circumstances, equitable deviation 
doctrine, which has been reformulated to provide added flexibility.299 
Administrative terms of a noncharitable trust may be modified under the 
cy pres doctrine.300 Trusts may be modified to achieve favorable tax 
results, terminated if they are not large enough to justify their costs of 
administration, or reformed if their terms do not reflect the settlor’s 
intentions.301 Further, the trust and its terms must be for the benefit of 
the beneficiaries,302 who must be entitled to receive information with 
respect to the trust.303 The compensation set by the settlor for the trustee 
may be adjusted if it proves to be unreasonably low or high,304 and the 
court may require a trustee to furnish a bond even if waived by the 
settlor.305 Unless the settlor provides otherwise in the terms of the trust, 
the grounds for changing the trustee have been expanded.306 With 
respect to charitable trusts, cy pres will be available without the need to 
first find that the settlor had a general charitable intent and may be 
applied if the settlor’s purposes become wasteful, as well as unlawful, 
impracticable, or impossible to achieve.307 In addition, the UTC imposes 
material limitations on the validity of gifts over from charitable trusts to 
 
 296. See supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text. 
 297. See supra notes 19-108 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. 
 299. See supra notes 60-75 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. 
 301. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text. 
 302. See supra notes 152-179 and accompanying text. 
 303. See supra notes 124-151 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra notes 224-230 and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra notes 231-233 and accompanying text. 
 306. See supra notes 240-266 and accompanying text. 
 307. See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text. 
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noncharitable beneficiaries.308 
In other respects, the UTC effects no change in the existing 
common law of trusts that limits the settlor’s ability to exert dead hand 
control.  For example, trust purposes and limitations on beneficiaries’ 
interests may not violate public policy,309 and the beneficiaries and 
trustee, by agreement, may circumvent the settlor’s intent.310 
Consistent with the common law, the UTC continues to honor the 
settlor’s intent in allowing the settlor to restrict the alienability of the 
beneficiary’s interest,311 including protecting it from the claims of the 
beneficiary’s creditors,312 and in prohibiting the beneficiaries from 
modifying or terminating the trust early if doing so would be 
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust (regardless of whether 
the benefits to the beneficiaries of the modification or termination 
outweigh the settlor’s material purpose).313 In other respects, the UTC 
provides greater protection to the settlor’s intent than under common 
law. Even testamentary trusts may be reformed to correct mistakes.314 
Settlors may enforce charitable trusts315 and petition for the removal of a 
trustee.316 Enforceable trusts for indefinite beneficiaries may be created, 
as may trusts for the care of pets and other noncharitable purposes.317 
Subject only to public policy limitations, the settlor may designate the 
law that will govern the administration of the trust without regard to 
whether the selected jurisdiction has contacts with the trustee, 
beneficiaries, or trust assets.318 With respect to the increasingly popular 
revocable trust, the UTC includes a number of intent-serving 
provisions.319 
Given the increasingly common use of perpetual and other long-
term trusts, the pace of change and complexity in our society now and in 
the foreseeable future, and our sensibilities with respect to private 
property rights and dead hand control, the UTC appears to have struck a 
reasonable balance between respecting the settlor’s intent and 
 
 308. See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra notes 205-223 and accompanying text. 
 310. See supra notes 285-295 and accompanying text. 
 311. See supra notes 109-123 and accompanying text. 
 312. See supra notes 114-123 and accompanying text. 
 313. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
 314. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text. 
 315. See supra note 97. 
 316. See supra notes 263-266 and accompanying text. 
 317. See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text. 
 318. See supra notes 219-223 and accompanying text. 
 319. See supra notes 274-284 and accompanying text. 
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accommodating the interests of beneficiaries. Undoubtedly, some will 
find it to have gone too far in favor of trust beneficiaries, while others 
will find it not to have gone far enough. In any case, this centuries old 
debate, like the new perpetual trusts that have contributed to its latest 
round, likely will continue into the indefinite future. 
